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 Promoting human rights is an important foreign policy goal for the United States.  
There are many foreign policy areas through which the U.S. promotes human rights 
including voting against countries which violate human rights in the Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs).  Promoting human rights, however, is not the only foreign 
policy goal of the U.S. in the MDBs.  The U.S. also seeks strategic goals such as 
supporting allies and promoting domestic economic prosperity as well in the MDBs.  
Realist international relations theory posits that strategic interests will trump promoting 
human rights in the MDBs. For the U.S. however liberal international relations theory 
argues that promoting human rights can be considered an equivalent foreign policy goal 
for countries such as the U.S.  Therefore strategic interests will not automatically trump 
promoting human rights for the U.S.   
 This dissertation seeks to answer two questions regarding human rights in U.S. 
foreign policy in the MDBs.  First, what role do human rights play in determining U.S. 
votes in the MDBs?  Here I find that a country’s record on violating political rights is a 
significant factor in determining whether the U.S. will vote in favor of proposals for that 
country.  A country’s record on violating rights of personal integrity, however, is not a 
significant factor.  Whether a country receives military aid from the U.S. and a country’s 
GDP per capita are also significant determinants of U.S. votes in the MDBs. The second 
  
question this dissertation answers regarding human rights in U.S. foreign policy in the 
MDBs is what rights specifically does the U.S. promote in the MDBs and which 
countries, specifically, does the U.S. vote against because of their human rights record.  
Overall, I find that while the U.S. has voted against loans going to many countries for 
human rights purposes the bulk of U.S. attention is centered on countries that fail to 
apprehend war criminals within their borders, primarily Serbia, and voting against loans 
that go to China. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of Problem 
  Are U.S. votes in the multilateral development banks (MDBs) conditioned on 
recipient countries respect for human rights?  In other words does the U.S. sanction 
countries with poor human rights records by voting to deny them loans in the MDBs?  In 
addition, what rights in particular does the U.S. seek to promote in the MDBs, and what 
countries in particular are singled out for sanction by the U.S. in the MDBs?  Human 
rights have become an important fixture of American foreign policy over the last several 
decades. However, the specific content of U.S. human rights policy, as well as its place 
among foreign policy priorities more generally, has varied considerably over the years 
(Forsythe 2002; Mertus 2004; Apodaca 2006; Blanton and Cingranelli 2010).  Despite 
the establishment of a stable body of international law on human rights from which to 
draw from, there has been significant variability in how the U.S. promotes human rights 
in its foreign policy, what rights it promotes, and what countries are targeted over others.    
One of the main explanations for this inconsistency is that U.S. human rights policy is 
simply a mask for pursuing core national security or economic interests, or in other words 
the liberalism of human rights is ultimately trumped by the realpolitik of self-interest.  
 Foreign aid, whether distributed directly, through bilateral aid, or indirectly 
through the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) is one of the tools through which 
the U.S. furthers its human rights policy (Apodaca 2006).  Using foreign aid to influence 
another country’s human rights policies involves either using assistance as a positive 
reinforcement – providing aid to those countries who have made improvements in the 
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protection of human rights, or as a negative sanction – withholding aid to countries which 
have an overall awful human rights record or are currently engaged in massive violations 
of human rights.  Several studies highlight the inconsistency with which the U.S. 
promotes human rights with bilateral aid – conditioning aid on the human rights practices 
of some states but not others.  However, except for a brief flurry of research in the 1980s, 
very few studies examine the role of human rights in U.S. multilateral aid policy. The 
U.S. has to vote on whether it will support or oppose every loan or grant proposal that 
comes before the World Bank and the rest of the MDBs. Therefore, the purpose of this 
dissertation is twofold.  First, to answer the question of whether U.S. votes in the MDBs 
are conditioned on recipient countries respect for human rights, and second, to identify 
which rights the U.S. promotes in the MDBs and which specific countries it targets for 
their human rights record in the MDBs.   
 
Reasons for Re-Evaluation 
 For a period during the 1980s the study of U.S. human rights policy in the MDBs 
was given some attention (Sanford 1982; Schoultz 1982; Mower Jr. 1987; Forsythe 1987; 
Forsythe 1988; and Stohl et al. 1989).  The main impetus for this surge in interest was the 
passage of the International Financial Institutions Act in 1977 (IFI Act).  Section 701 of 
the IFI act instructed the U.S. Executive Directors (USEDs) in the MDBs to use their 
“voice and vote” to direct assistance away from countries which systematically violate 
individual human rights unless the assistance would directly contribute to the basic 
human needs of the recipient countries citizens.  Many of these early studies examined 
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the U.S. record on human rights votes1 in the MDBs after the passage of the IFI act and 
found a distinct Cold War bias in the U.S. voting pattern.  For example, during the first 
Reagan administration a clear double standard emerged: the U.S. opposed loans going to 
left-wing regimes and supported loans going to right-wing regimes with human rights 
playing a muted role in voting decisions (Forsythe 1987). In other words, the early 
research on the subject generally concluded that human rights did not constitute much of 
a factor in U.S. voting decisions in the MDBs, especially when contrasted with security 
interests.  However, since this initial research on the subject the question has not been 
addressed and there are several reasons for a re-evaluation at this time 
 First, Congress has recently taken a renewed interest in the operation of the 
MDBs, including addressing the role of human rights in U.S. multilateral aid policy. 
The IFI Act passed in 1977 represents just the first attempt by Congress to integrate 
concern for human rights into voting decisions by the U.S.  Currently there are fifteen 
separate pieces of legislation that govern the issue including provisions requiring USEDs 
to vote against proposed loans and grants to countries which violate their citizen’s rights 
of religious freedom, fail to combat human trafficking, or fail to apprehend war criminals, 
among other human rights issues.  In addition, there has been legislation passed that 
requires the USEDs to vote against loans going to specific countries for their ongoing 
human rights violations.  With the addition of these new legislative mandates over the 
past thirty years it is important to see how they have influenced the voting record of the 
U.S. in the MDBs subsequently.    
                                                        
1 I use the term “votes” to describe the U.S. position on each lending project but formal 
votes are rarely taken in the MDBs.  Projects are approved based on a consensus of the 
members of the Executive Board. 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 Second, recently the U.S. approach to foreign aid has been to emphasize 
performance based lending, which stipulates that recipient countries should meet certain 
policy requirements before receiving aid, and should also be rewarded with aid for 
meeting those requirements (Babb 2009).  The best expression of this approach is the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was established in 2004 during the Bush 
administration.  The MCA allows partnerships to develop between the U.S. and 
developing countries for the delivery of foreign aid except that the recipient countries 
have to meet certain selection criteria first before the partnership can begin.  Human 
rights, specifically political freedom, respect for civil liberties and respect for the rule of 
law, are some of the selection criteria used by the MCA along with provisions on 
transparency and good governance (Hook 2008). 
 Third, in 2004 the U.S. Congress mandated that the Treasury Department make 
public its positions (yes, no, or abstain) on each proposal that is voted on by the MDBs.2 
They are also required to give a reason as to why they voted no or abstained from voting 
on each proposal they oppose.  These “reason codes” primarily refer to the section of the 
legislation that governs the vote in question and range from general economic 
considerations to political concerns such as human rights, environmental protection, and 
support for international terrorism among others.  There are twenty-two separate reason 
codes covering human rights.  Some of the human rights reason codes are country 
specific (Burma, Cambodia, Cuba, Serbia, and Zimbabwe) while others cover specific 
types of human rights violations (war crimes, workers rights, female genital mutilation,                                                         
2 The IFI Act similarly required the Treasury Department to report to Congress on a 
quarterly basis its votes in the MDBs.  The practice was discontinued in the early 1990s 
as the Treasury Department claimed that it had insufficient staff to meet the requirement 
(Sanford 1997). 
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and religious persecution).  These are in addition to the general human rights provisions 
of section 701 of the IFI Act.  The recent publication of U.S. votes in the MDBs, along 
with the reason codes indicating why the U.S. voted the way it did, provides a rich new 
source of empirical content to analyze. 
 Fourth, as was mentioned, the earlier studies on human rights and U.S. voting 
decisions in the MDBs were primarily done in the 1980s.  These studies concluded that 
there was a significant Cold War bias in U.S. voting and human rights did not constitute a 
significant factor in U.S. voting decisions.  Research on human rights and bilateral aid 
has also shown a significant Cold War bias in the distribution of aid during the Cold War.  
However, the research also shows that after the Cold War human rights considerations 
became more prominent in the distribution of bilateral aid (Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and 
Moskowitz 2009; Blanton and Cingranelli 2010).  These bilateral aid findings provide 
additional impetus for revisiting the question of how human rights influence U.S. voting 
decisions in the MDBs since this same post Cold War pattern may also be visible in U.S. 
multilateral aid decisions. 
 Finally, there have been significant methodological advancements since the 
original research on the role of human rights in U.S. MDB voting decisions appeared.  
Much of that original research consisted of simple correlations between a single human 
rights measure and U.S. votes, which did not take into consideration additional 
independent variables or particular contexts in which human rights might matter.  
Additionally, there have been significant advancements in the development of human 
rights measures since the earlier research was published.  Much of the original research 
used Freedom House scores that only measure respect for civil and political rights, 
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however since then various new measures have been developed.  For example, The 
Political Terror Scale (PTS), which measures violations of rights of personal integrity in a 
state using both State Department country reports and reports from Amnesty 
International, provides an additional measure of human rights violations not captured by 
the Freedom House measures (Wood and Gibney 2010).   
  
Contribution 
 The main research question addressed in this study is to what extent are U.S. 
votes in the MDBs conditioned on recipient countries respect for human rights?  Also, 
what rights does the U.S. promote in the MDBs and which countries does the U.S. chose 
to sanction for their human rights record. This dissertation will address these questions 
through an analysis of U.S. voting behavior in the MDBs.  First through a multivariate 
analysis that will determine how human rights influence U.S. votes compared to how 
other foreign policy goals such as supporting allies and promoting domestic economic 
prosperity determine U.S. votes.  Secondly, through an analysis of the reason codes to 
identify which rights the U.S. promotes and which countries it sanctions for its human 
rights record. 
 The multivariate analysis places concern for human rights among other important 
foreign policy concerns, specifically ensuring national security and promoting domestic 
economic prosperity.  In broader terms this places normative concerns, promoting human 
rights, among strategic concerns, ensuring national security and promoting domestic 
economic prosperity.  The usefulness of this approach is that it does not treat promoting 
human rights and pursuing strategic interests as mutually exclusive but rather as 
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“sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting objectives.” (Rosenblum and 
Salehyan 2004: 681). In reality these factors are not mutually exclusive and are instead 
often reinforcing. There is an inherent difficulty in separating interests and values when 
dealing with U.S. foreign policy as they are often intertwined.  Additionally, there is 
often a strategic dimension to policies that are thought of as based primarily on values.  
For example, in the 2002 National Security Strategy the Bush administration outlined 
global development as the third pillar of its approach to national security thus making the 
connection that helping poor people out of poverty is vital to U.S. national security 
(National Security Council 2002).   
 Countries can be placed on both axes (human rights and strategic interest) to 
determine whether the U.S. will vote against their proposals in the MDBs.  Countries that 
have a good human rights record and are strategically important to the U.S. will receive 
support and countries that have a poor human rights record and are not strategically 
important to the U.S. will not receive U.S. support.  The interesting source of variation 
will come from countries that have a poor human rights record but are strategically 
important to the U.S., and conversely those countries with good human rights records but 
are not strategically important to the U.S.    
 Strategic interests broach a whole host of national security and economic issues. 
From the national security perspective strategic interests include everything from specific 
matters such as financing reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan for example, to 
broad grand strategy themes such as containing the spread of communism, or as a means 
of controlling and preventing transnational terrorism.  In this dissertation, the foreign 
policy goal of ensuring national security is conceptualized as support for allies (whether 
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formal or informal).  More specifically, support for allies in this dissertation contains two 
measures—reception of military aid and voting affinity in the UN General Assembly.  
Both measures are indicators of formal or informal allies in that countries that receive 
military aid from the U.S. can be considered military allies and countries that have a 
close voting affinity with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly can be considered 
political allies with the U.S.   From the economic perspective strategic interests range 
from the general, like promoting economic growth worldwide, to the national, such as 
providing new markets for U.S. goods, to the parochial, such as ensuring procurement 
contract for U.S. firms.  In this dissertation, the foreign policy goal of promoting 
domestic economic prosperity is operationalized as volume of trade between the U.S. and 
recipient country.  
 Promoting human rights in U.S. foreign policy can be broken down into two 
separate but related categories: political rights and rights of personal integrity.  Political 
rights encompass a whole range of rights including-- rights of free expression, and rights 
associated with the practice of democracy such as the right to vote and participate in the 
political process.  Rights of personal integrity also encompass a wide range of specific 
rights including-- prohibitions against torture and cruel and inhumane punishment, as 
well as prohibitions against slavery and forced labor, and finally prohibitions against 
arbitrary detention and arrest (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).  Both of these categories of 
rights are well grounded in international documents such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(1966); not to mention that many of these rights are found in the foundational documents 
of the United States, namely the U.S. Constitution.   
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 The reason code analysis is a more in depth examination of the U.S. voting record 
in the MDBs.  Specifically, it will examine when the U.S. voted against proposals in the 
MDBs, against which countries, and for what reasons (e.g. human rights). There are 64 
reason codes that correspond to legislative mandates that require the USED to use their 
“voice and vote” to steer policy in the MDBs.  Depending on the wording of the 
legislation, and subsequent directives in committee reports, the leeway of the USEDs 
(and by extension the Treasury Department and other Executive Branch agencies 
involved in U.S. MDB policymaking) to vote a particular way can vary.  When a reason 
code is applied it is a signal that the USED is voting that way because of a specific 
legislative mandate. Or in other words, the reason code represents the primary legislative 
grounds on which the voting decision was based.  The reason code analysis provides the 
primary evidence for determining which rights the U.S. promotes in the MDBs and which 
countries the U.S. chooses to sanction for their human rights record.   
 Finally, as an extension of the reason code analysis, this dissertation also includes 
a case study of U.S. MDB voting decisions regarding China.  Each loan proposal that the 
U.S. has to vote on is analyzed first through an inter-agency process led by the Treasury 
Department.  It is through this process by which decisions are made as to whether the 
U.S. should vote yes or no (or abstain) on loan projects, and if they decide to vote no (or 
abstain) then for what reason?  The case study will examine how the voting decisions 
were made regarding China and how both strategic interests and human rights influenced 
those decisions.  The reason for focusing on China is twofold.  First, relations with China 
for the U.S. have significant security and economic aspects.  China is one of the U.S.’s 
main strategic rivals and economically speaking, China and the U.S. are heavily 
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dependent on one another for economic benefits with China being maybe the most 
important economic partner of the U.S.  In terms of trade volume between the United 
States and China, from 2004-2009 level of trade between the two countries averaged 
$338 billion.     Secondly, China accounts for a large percentage of projects in both the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank and also accounts for over half of the 
no/abstain votes from the U.S. so understanding the reason for that is particularly 
important. 
 Rhetorically the US is an advocate for the universal application of human rights 
standards.  In practice, however, the US has shown bias in its promotion of certain rights 
over others, and in criticizing the human rights records of certain states and not other 
states with equivalent human rights practices (Koh 2005).  One assumption is that 
countries with close strategic ties to the U.S. will be exempt from criticism, or at least be 
subject to weaker forms of criticism, from the US for their human rights practices.  
During the Cold War this type of bias was evident in both multilateral and bilateral aid 
contexts (Schoultz 1982; Meernik, Krueger, Poe 1998).  In the post Cold War 
environment human rights have become somewhat more prominent in the allocation of 
US bilateral aid (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009).  Whether this same pattern is 
evident in current US policy in the MDBs is something that this dissertation will address.  
 
Limitations 
 There are some important limitations in this study. The main limitation is that the 
voting record only reflects the US position on projects that have come before the 
Executive Boards for formal approval.  One cannot discern from the voting record the US 
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position on projects that do not make it to the Executive Board for final approval, and 
there is evidence to suggest that the US has considerable informal influence at the stages 
before a loan proposal makes it to the Executive Board. It has been suggested that 
proposals that the US would seriously disapprove of are stopped well before they get to 
the Executive Board stage (Wade 2002, Woods 2003).  In addition, several studies have 
shown that the U.S. has been particularly successful in affecting MDB activities through 
informal channels involving staffing decisions and choice of leadership (Babb 2009; 
Andersen et al 2006; Woods 2003; Wade 2002).  Finally, because of the consensus 
decision-making requirement much of the politicking on decisions takes place before the 
Executive Boards meet making it difficult to observe horse-trading and other political 
dynamics that occur in all political bodies (Woods 2006). 
 Another limitation of relying on U.S. votes in the MDBs is that the U.S. does not 
possess veto power over the distribution of loans/grants, so even if the U.S. votes against 
a certain project there is a great chance that the project will still be approved.  In most 
cases the U.S. along with the other advanced democracies can muster enough voting 
shares to veto a project however this is extremely rare.  So in other words, once a project 
has made it to the Executive Board it is almost impossible for the U.S. to prevent it from 
being approved, which diminishes the impact a U.S. no vote may have.  On the other 
hand, “no” votes by the U.S. do send an important signal to other countries.  State 
Department officials in particular have expressed how important the signal is the U.S. 
sends with its votes in the MDBs.  One State Department official is quoted as stating, 
“Other governments take U.S. votes as statements concerning their economic solvency or 
probity, so these votes directly impinge on U.S. foreign policy.” (quoted in Sanford 2005: 
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2).  On the surface it may seem that a US “no” vote has little consequence for the 
recipient country since they will almost certainly receive the loan anyway.  A “no” vote, 
especially when it is coupled with a reason code stating why the US voted no, has 
diplomatic consequences and sends a signal to that country and others (including private 
investors) of official U.S. disapproval.  
 A further limitation of this study is that it only considers how the U.S. uses it 
“voice and vote” in the MDBs but not how the U.S. uses the “power of the purse” in 
formulating policy towards the MDBs.  The administration recommends MDB funding 
levels to Congress through the budget process and Congress responds with legislation 
authorizing and appropriating funding.  Throughout the years Congress has attempted to 
use the appropriation process as a means of leveraging policy changes in the MDBs 
(Sanford 1978; 2001).  An example of this can be seen in the authorization of funding for 
MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), which is a member of the World 
Bank group, in 1998.  The authorizing legislation stated that no contribution could be 
made to MIGA until it adopted U.S. proposed standards on worker’s rights and limit 
insuring projects that directly competed with U.S. production (Sanford 2001).  Although 
the attempts by Congress to influence policy in the MDBs through the “power of the 
purse” are important and give insight into how human rights may influence U.S. policy in 
the MDBs, the exclusive focus on voting behavior used in this study is necessary to limit 
the scope of the project.  Also, recent attempts by Congress to use funding authorizations 
to leverage policy changes in the MDBs have dealt with corruption and good governance 
issues as opposed to human rights considerations. 
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Plan for Rest of Dissertation 
 Chapter two contains the literature review, which is comprised of three main 
sections. The first section contains a review of the literature on multilateralism and what 
benefits states receive by operating through multilateral institutions.   Multilateral aid 
obviously differs from bilateral aid in that with the distribution of bilateral aid the U.S. 
has full control over where funds are distributed and for what reasons.  However, by 
willingly operating in a multilateral setting the U.S. is conceding a significant amount of 
control over how the resources it contributes will be used.  Therefore it is necessary to 
incorporate the reasons why the U.S. chooses to operate in international institutions into 
any overall explanation for the place of human rights in U.S. multilateral aid policy. 
 The next sections of chapter two review the previous literature on human rights 
and U.S. foreign policy in general and the literature on human rights and U.S. multilateral 
aid policy and human rights and U.S. bilateral aid policy respectively. Much as human 
rights are a variable component of U.S. foreign policy in general, the same can be said of 
their place in both U.S. multilateral and bilateral aid policy.  The majority of the literature 
on human rights in U.S. MDB policy focused on the 1970s and 1980s after the passage of 
the IFI Act and focused on how it has been implemented.  In general, these studies find 
that the U.S. exhibited a bias in the implementation of the IFI act by not voting against 
loans that were going to allies that violated human rights, but voting against loans that 
went to adversaries that had similar human rights records.  The main drawback of this 
literature is that it exclusively focuses on the period following the passage of the IFI act 
(late 1970s-1980s) so the analysis is heavily colored by the Cold War paradigm.   
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 This issue is mitigated to a certain degree by looking at the literature on human 
rights in U.S. bilateral aid policy.  This literature is much more extensive and wide-
ranging and, more importantly, covers the Cold War era and the post Cold War era.  One 
of the significant findings of this literature is that the promotion of human rights has 
become somewhat more universal in the post Cold War era, i.e., the favoritism showed to 
U.S. allies on their human rights record dissipated somewhat. Additionally, this literature 
provides a more nuanced explanation of the place of human rights in U.S. bilateral aid 
policy.  It shows that factors such as the level of economic development of the recipient 
country, or the type of government regime the recipient country also have to be factored 
into the equation when determining how human rights influence aid decisions.   
 The final section describes the background, organization, lending activity, and 
decision-making process of the MDBs.  The MDBs are sister organizations, in that they 
are separate institutions but also have the same basic structure and purpose.  The MDBs 
all serve the same essential purpose – the alleviation of poverty through the financing of 
development projects in poor countries.  The World Bank is the largest of the MDBs in 
terms of lending capability with the four regional banks – the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) serving a smaller role.  Each MDB has a Board of Executive 
Directors that makes the decision on whether to approve any particular loan or grant 
package.  A majority consensus among members of the Executive Board is required for 
approval of any proposal.  This process of seeking majority consensus opens the door for 
politics to enter into the process and that opens the MDBs to U.S. influence.   
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 Chapter three contains the multivariate analysis.  The chapter is broken down into 
two main sections: research design and results.  The research design section includes the 
theoretical framework, hypothesis, data, and methodology. The theoretical framework 
utilized argues that US foreign policy is the result of an interaction between normative 
(i.e. promoting human rights) and strategic elements (i.e. ensuring national security and 
promoting domestic economic prosperity).  U.S. support for proposals in the MDBs 
depends on where a state is located along these two axes.  The usefulness of the model is 
that it does not treat promoting human rights and pursuing strategic interests as mutually 
exclusive.  The hypothesis section lays out five hypothesis that test the relationships 
between the independent variables of human rights, national security, economic 
importance, and economic development and the dependent variable of U.S. votes in the 
MDBs.  More specifically I hypothesize that the U.S. will vote against countries that 
violate both political rights and rights of personal integrity.  As far as strategic interests 
are concerned, I hypothesize that the U.S. will not vote against its allies, nor vote against 
countries it considers to be economically important.  Finally, I hypothesize that the U.S. 
will not vote against poorer countries (relatively speaking) in the MDBs. 
 The data section describes in detail the parameters of the U.S. MDB voting 
record, which is the primary data source for this dissertation.  The U.S. voting record in 
this study spans from 2004-2009 and includes 9,766 country year observations.  The 
voting record includes a brief description of the projects, which Bank and Lending 
Window it was brought before, the date it was voted on, the amount of the loan, how the 
U.S. voted on the proposal (yes, no, abstain), and a reason code.   The overall voting 
record is heavily skewed towards yes votes, with the U.S. voting to approve projects 
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around 87% of the time. Finally, the methodology section describes the logistic 
regression technique used to test the main hypotheses.  The results section of Chapter 3 
contains the main empirical findings. In addition to descriptive statistics this section also 
includes a presentation and discussion of the results from the logistic regression model.  
Additionally, results for the effect of human rights on predicted values are also presented.  
Two further tests are then presented to determine exactly the influence of human rights 
on U.S. MDB voting decisions.  The first is a test of the model with the worst human 
rights (political) abusing states removed.  This is to test how much influence those 
countries have on U.S. voting decisions.  The second test is a test of the model with 
proposals brought by China removed.  This was done to test whether the influence on 
human rights in determining U.S. votes in the MDBs was simply the result of a large 
number of proposals brought forth by China.  
 Chapter four contains the reason code analysis.  This chapter is comprised of four 
main sections.   The chapter begins by describing the U.S. MDB voting decision process 
of which the reason codes are a product.  There is an inter-agency process involving the 
Treasury, State, Commerce and other federal government agencies, which reviews every 
project proposal that comes before the Executive Board at each Bank. They then provide 
directives to the USED on how to vote on each of those proposals.  This section will 
describe this process in detail.  The second section describes and categorizes the 
legislation which the reason codes reference. The top reason codes are broken down into 
four categories – human rights, transparency, environment, and economics.  Human 
rights are the most prominent category in terms of frequency of application and in the 
number of reason codes included in the category (22).  The human rights category itself 
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can be further refined into three separate sections – general human rights, specific human 
rights violations, and country specific legislation. 
 The following section examines the application of the reason codes.  Specifically 
a breakdown of the use of human rights reason codes, including, which codes appear 
more frequently than others, which countries have codes applied to them more frequently 
than others, and which specific human rights violations are targeted over others.  Finally, 
this chapter will also contain a case study on China, and describe how and why the U.S. 
voted on proposals for China and whether, and in what ways, human rights offer any 
explanatory power in describing the voting decisions.   
 Chapter five consists of the conclusion to the dissertation.  This conclusion puts 
the empirical findings presented in Chapters three and four in the larger context of U.S. 
foreign policy.  Specifically, this section will look at the place of human rights in U.S. 
MDB policy as compared to U.S. bilateral aid policy and in the even larger circumstance 
of U.S. human rights policy in general.  The concluding chapter also includes a section on 
further areas of research and finally a section on the normative implications of this 
dissertation and to what extent human rights should be a part of U.S. foreign policy in the 
MDBs 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Why Multilateralism? 
This chapter is broken down into three sections; the first contains a review of the 
literature on multilateralism and why states pursue policies through multilateral means. 
The second section contains a review of the relevant literature on human rights and U.S. 
foreign policy in general, and U.S. multilateral aid policy and human rights and U.S. 
bilateral aid policy in particular.  Finally, the last section provides extensive background 
on the multilateral development banks (MDBs) including their major functions, historical 
background, lending practices, organization and decision-making procedures. 
In any study on multilateral institutions an important point to consider is what 
benefits do states like the United States derive from multilateralism and what effect do 
those benefits have on U.S. policy in multilateral institutions?  This is an important 
consideration since by definition operating through any multilateral institutions requires 
states to give up some control over policy.  John Ruggie (1992: 568) defines 
multilateralism as, “coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with 
certain principles.” These principles orientate particular actions for participants that do 
not heed reference to the specific needs of each individual participant. James Caporaso 
(1992: 602) claims that multilateralism is differentiated from other forms of organization 
by three factors, “indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse 
reciprocity.”  In other words, multilateralism is a form of organization that is 
characterized by rules that proscribe state action for mutual long-term benefit.   Ruggie 
(1992) points out that the concept of “most favored nation” is a particular example of 
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multilateralism since under its rules it treats countries that produce the same product the 
same.  In addition, multilateral institutions (such as the MDBs) are differentiated from 
international orders or regimes because they have formal voting, or consensus, rules 
which embody the principles of the institution (Ruggie 1992).  
The standard neoliberal explanation for the usefulness of multilateral 
organizations is that they facilitate cooperation between states by reducing transaction 
costs and providing a forum where states interact with one another on a regular basis, 
which increases the likelihood of cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).   
Additionally, multilateral organizations allow states to pursue common goals by virtue of 
their centralization and independence.  Centralization facilitates collective action to 
achieve these common goals while independence allows the institution to pursue these 
common goals without the dictates from individual states that may hamper collective 
action (Abbott and Snidal 1998).  Finally, once institutions have been established they 
tend to take on a life of their own as states have become invested in their continual 
operation (Keohane 1984).  An alternative realist viewpoint is that international 
institutions simply reflect the underlying power realities of the international system and 
are oriented to support the dominant states (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). 
The social constructivist argument for the benefits of multilateral organizations is 
that they operate as carriers and distributers of international norms (Finnemore 1993; 
Finnemore 1996, Checkel 1998).  For example, as Finnemore (1993) points out states 
adopted science policy bureaucracies because international organizations, particularly 
UNESCO, promoted them.  Of course, constructivists also contend that IOs, because of 
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their autonomy and independent sources of power, often change in ways states did not 
anticipate or ask for (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).   
 With regards to foreign aid, Rodrik (1995) argues that there are two primary 
benefits of multilateralism for donor states.  One of the benefits is that multilateral aid 
institutions are better at monitoring the countries that receive aid and therefore better 
positioned to ensure that the aid is being used for its intended purpose.  Second, 
multilateral institutions are also in a better position to impose conditions on the reception 
of aid.  Because donors pool their aid together and distribute it through one institution 
recipient countries are prevented from playing donor countries against one another for 
more aid or favorable lending conditions (Rodrik 1995).  
Helen Milner (2006) argues that the decision by donor states to distribute aid 
through multilateral institutions is the result of different preferences between donor 
governments and their publics.  Whereas donor governments see aid primarily as a 
vehicle to further their political and/or economic foreign policy goals, their publics see 
aid as a way to help out those in need.  Therefore they see multilateral agencies as better 
able to fulfill those needs than their own governments.  Milner concludes that when 
donor country publics are more skeptical of bilateral aid, states give more aid through 
multilateral institutions (Milner 2006).   
For what benefits, or to serve what ends, then does the U.S. choose to channel a 
measure of its foreign aid through multilateral institutions?  The question is relevant 
because as the hegemonic state the U.S. is giving up a significant measure of autonomy 
to allow its resources to be distributed by a multilateral body, which it does not have 
complete control over.  Ikenberry (2001; 2003) argues that the U.S. pursued a strategy of 
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building multilateral institutions after World War II in an effort to “lock in” other states 
into an international order that is inherently favorable to the U.S.  In essence the U.S. was 
willing to give up some of its sovereignty to multilateral institutions to create an 
institutionalized international order that serves its long-term interests.  This is preferable, 
and less costly, for the hegemon as compared to operating in a system of free-floating 
alliances and loose connections between states (Ikenberry 2003).  An additional benefit 
the U.S. receives from operating multilaterally is international legitimacy.  The strategic 
restraint argument offered by Ikenberry (2001) posits that a hegemonic state like the U.S. 
purposefully binds itself to institutions in an effort to entice other states to follow.  This 
leads to a more stable international order, which benefits the dominant state.  This 
process of placing self-imposed limits on oneself give the United States a measure of 
legitimacy which helps maintain its hegemonic status (Rapkin and Braaten 2009).   
In addition to benefits like legitimacy and a more beneficial international order 
there are other benefits the U.S. receives from operating in multilateral organizations 
such as the MDBs.  As was mentioned earlier the main benefits of international 
organizations is they help correct market failures by reducing transaction costs, providing 
a forum where information is shared, and institutionalizes reciprocity to prevent cheating 
(Keohane and Martin 1995).  The U.S. sees the MDBs as beneficial institutions that help 
further U.S. foreign policy goals by getting other states to help achieve them.  For 
example, Milner and Tingley (2010) suggest that support for multilateral aid from the 
American public derives from notions of burden-sharing and cost control.  Americans 
tend to support multilateralism, to the extent that they do, because they think it “will be 
cheaper than unilateralism in the long run.” (Lake 1999: 220)   
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Another way of looking at why the U.S. would cede some of its sovereignty to 
join international organizations is because in practice it does not actually give up much 
sovereignty.  Or in other words, since the U.S. exercises considerable influence in 
international organizations it can influence the policies that IOs pursue.  There is a 
considerable literature that argues that international organizations often serve U.S. 
foreign policy goals, or at a minimum that the U.S. exercises extensive influence in 
determining outcomes in international institutions.  For example, when the study of 
international organizations started to become more commonplace, early critics pointed 
out that these institutions did not offer the cooperative benefits that supporters claimed 
and that these institutions actually served as foreign policy tools of the dominant states 
(Strange 1983).   
With specific reference to the MDBs there has been a recent swell of literature, 
which argues that decisions made by these institutions are often in line with U.S. policy.  
For example, Fleck and Kilby (2006) have found that U.S. commercial interests influence 
the geographical distribution of World Bank loans and that U.S. influence in the World 
Bank varies across presidential administrations.  In a follow up study Kilby (2006), 
focusing on the influence of Japan and the United States on the distribution of lending by 
the Asian Development Bank, found that both American and Japanese political factors 
influence ADB lending more than humanitarian concerns, and that donor interests 
influence lending more in the ADB than in the World Bank.  In another study, Andersen 
et al. (2005) used voting similarity in the United Nations General Assembly as a proxy 
variable in determining a country’s relationship (ally or enemy) with the United States 
and compared that with the dollar amount of World Bank loans that country received.  
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They found a statistically significant relationship indicating that the U.S. is able to 
influence the lending patterns of the World Bank.    
These quantitative studies are backed up by more qualitatively oriented studies, 
which tend to focus on the informal influence the U.S. wields in the MDBs.  For instance, 
Robert Wade (2002) argues that in the World Bank the U.S. exercises considerable 
control over prominent staffing decisions, not least of which is the President, therefore 
ensuring that people in charge of directing policy will be aligned with U.S. interests. 
McKeown (2009) also finds on U.S. control of multilateral institutions that: 
[U.S.] Government officials appear to have viewed the difference between their 
 formal  authority when acting unilaterally and acting through a multilateral 
 organization as typically of little practical consequence, because in neither 
 situation did they view the formal rules as the binding constraint.  Thus, when the 
 formal rules of an organization suggest that wealthy and influential national 
 governments have delegated substantial decision-making authority to it, this 
 might be because national governments expect that their informal means of 
 control will prevent “free wheeling” by their own delegations and others (275). 
 
In effect, the U.S. makes up for the restraint in autonomy that the formal rules of 
international organizations place upon it through informal influence.  Woods (2003) also 
focuses on the informal influence the U.S. exercises in MDBs such as the World Bank, 
noting that during the project development stage U.S. approval is sought, and projects in 
which the U.S. would strongly object to do not get past this stage.  Woods (2000) 
however argues that the U.S. cannot, and does not, completely dominate the World Bank 
policymaking process.  The reason is the U.S. needs the World Bank to help achieve 
objectives that it cannot achieve on its own such as encouraging trade liberalization and 
better governance in developing countries.  
 In summary, the U.S. operates in multilateral organizations such as the MDBs 
because they help achieve common goals, which the U.S. either cannot, or are too 
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expensive to, achieve on its own.  Also the U.S. as the hegemonic state has reaped 
legitimacy benefits by constraining itself in multilateral institutions.  Finally, the major 
downside of multilateralism for individual states is that it restricts autonomy and range of 
action, but the U.S. through its exercise of informal influence is largely able to make up 
for those restrictions in the MDBs. The next issue to consider is exactly what are U.S. 
preferences in regards to foreign aid and human rights.  The next section looks at 
previous work on the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy and in particular with 
regards to multilateral and bilateral aid. 
 
Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy 
The place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy has been described as 
“paradoxical” (Apodaca 2006), a “bait and switch” (Mertus 2004), and as “permanent but 
ambivalent” (Forsythe 2002).  What these phrases convey is that the promotion of human 
rights by the U.S. has been inconsistent in both form and content.  On the one hand the 
U.S. has been exceptional in its promotion of human rights abroad and led the way 
among developed democratic governments in making human rights an important 
component of its foreign policy.  This process began with an assertive Congress in the 
mid 1970s, passing numerous laws making human rights a factor in a number of foreign 
policy decisions, including the distribution of foreign aid  (Blanton and Cingranelli 
2010).  The foreign policy issues in which the human rights practices of targeted states 
have been considered by the U.S. include: the distribution of multilateral and bilateral 
economic aid, the distribution of military aid (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 
1992; Poe and Meernik 1995), arm sales (Blanton 2000; Blanton 2005), trade agreements 
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(Hafner-Burton 2009), economic sanctions (Drury and Li 2006) and asylum policy 
(Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004) among other issue areas.  As Harold Koh (2005: 119) 
has claimed: “to this day, the United States remains the only superpower capable, and at 
times, willing, to commit real resources and make real sacrifices to build, sustain, and 
drive an international system committed to international law, democracy, and the 
promotion of human rights.”  On the other hand, as Koh also points out, the U.S. applies 
a double standard on human rights, not only applying different rules to itself than it does 
to the rest of the world, but also by holding its allies to different standards on human 
rights than its enemies.  In other words the U.S. often claims to represent universal 
standards in human rights, but in practice it often does not live up to those standards. 
The reality is that no state can make human rights its only foreign policy priority, 
additional issues such as upholding national security, strengthening economic relations, 
and supporting development are objectives that states seek that may be incompatible with 
supporting human rights in certain situations (Baehr 2009).  The tension between the 
various foreign policy goals the U.S. pursues can be conceived as a difference between 
pursuing normative goals (promoting human rights) and strategic or material goals 
(upholding national security, strengthening economic relations) (Rosenblum and 
Salehyan 2004).  More broadly, this difference is essentially a distinction between 
liberalism and realism in U.S. foreign policy.  
Promoting human rights is not often associated with promoting the material well 
being of a country like upholding national security and strengthening economic relations 
are, though it can be argued that promoting human rights can have long-term benefits for 
liberal democracies such as the U.S. (Schultz 2002).  Promoting human rights is often 
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seen as an expression of morality in foreign policy as opposed to promotion of the 
national interest, which includes pursuing strategic and material goals (Baehr 2009).  
Foreign policy realists posit that morality should be subordinated to promoting the 
national interest in a state’s foreign policy, or they often conflate morality with promoting 
the national interest.  This viewpoint is best seen in the work of Henry Kissinger (1994), 
who argues that U.S. foreign policy should promote stability and that the logic of the 
balance of power requires states to promote their material interests ahead of morality.  
Foreign policy liberalism, on the other hand, takes the promotion of human rights norms 
as an equally important component of foreign policy as ensuring national security and 
promoting domestic economic prosperity.  With regards to the U.S. this takes on two 
forms.  One form is an absolutist position in which the U.S. (and all states) should have 
an unwavering support for promoting human rights abroad and should be itself subject to 
international standards on human rights.  This cosmopolitan viewpoint is best seen in the 
early years of the Carter administration where human rights were considered a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy (Forsythe 2011).  The other viewpoint is American 
exceptionalism, which views the U.S. as a special nation engaged in an experiment in 
personal liberty.  This belief can lead to a viewpoint that since America is exceptional it 
has a mandate to spread norms of personal liberty abroad.  It can also lead to an opposing 
view that because the U.S. is exceptional it should simply focus on cultivating personal 
liberty at home (Forsythe 2006; 2011).  These tensions in the overall orientation of U.S. 
foreign policy have lead to inconsistencies in promoting human rights as they proscribe 
oppositional policies for any particular situation the U.S. may find itself in. 
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U.S. inconsistency in supporting human rights is therefore not surprising, but the 
interesting question is how important are human rights in U.S. foreign policy generally 
and more specifically in what context do human rights matter in U.S. foreign policy?  
Foreign aid, whether delivered through multilateral institutions or bilaterally, is a 
mechanism through which the U.S. can achieve its foreign policy goals.  Therefore, 
studying the distribution of U.S. bilateral aid, or in the case of this dissertation U.S. votes 
in the MDBs one can examine how the multiple foreign policy goals are reflected in the 
outcomes and what relative attention each goal receives. 
 
 Human Rights and U.S. Multilateral Aid Policy 
There is considerable research on the question of whether human rights are a 
significant determinant of MDB loans (Neumayer 2003a; Neumayer 2003b; Lebovic and 
Voeten 2009) and whether MDB loans and structural adjustment programs are 
detrimental to human rights (Abouhard and Cingranelli 2006; Abouhard and Cingranelli 
2008; Eriksen and de Soysa 2009).  For example, Abouhard and Cingranelli (2008) find 
that the structural adjustment conditions that are attached to World Bank (and IMF) loans 
have had a negative influence on human rights.  The structural adjustment policies often 
require governments to reduce social welfare spending and that tends to invoke public 
backlash, which is then often put down violently by the governments in questions. Mac 
Darrow (2003) also notes that the World Bank, despite its insistence that it is a non-
political institution, has let its lending policies steadily encroach upon issues that impact 
human rights such as combating HIV/AIDS, combating child labor, and promoting good 
governance. 
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Research on whether human rights influence U.S. policy in the MDBs however 
has not been as prevalent.  With the general interest in human rights developing in both 
Congress and the Carter administration in the 1970s, and with the passage of the IFI act 
in 1977, there was an initial surge of attention in the question of human rights in U.S. 
multilateral aid policy, but it has not received sustained attention since the 1980s. The 
original research into the question generally concluded that human rights took a back seat 
to geopolitical concerns during the Cold War.  
 According to Elizabeth Spiro (1977) U.S. human rights policy regarding 
multilateral aid consists of using bilateral tactics within a multilateral environment. Two 
specific tactics in particular stand out: first trying to create a human rights coalition 
among other like-minded countries willing to deny loans for human rights reasons, and; 
second pursuing a human rights policy that also serves the economic and geopolitical 
interests of the United States.  Jonathan Sanford (1982) points out, however, that from the 
period of 1977 (when the IFI act went into effect) to 1981 there is no discernible evidence 
that abstentions and no votes by the U.S. for human rights reasons effected lending to 
specific countries.  He does note, however, that as a signaling mechanism U.S. no votes 
can have an impact.  In addition, he points out that the votes painted a somewhat 
inconsistent picture as the decision to vote against certain loan proposals stemmed not so 
much from the human rights record of the recipient country as from its ideological 
orientation (anti-Communist vs. pro-Communist) (Sanford 1982).   
 Lars Schoultz (1982) also examined U.S. votes in the MDBs during the same time 
period and found that human rights were one of the main reasons the U.S. voted no on 
particular loans (although no votes overall were quite rare).  But he also points out how 
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the no votes cast ostensibly for human rights reasons also had a distinct ideological 
dimension as well.  In addition, Schoultz (1982) points out the overwhelming presence of 
Latin American countries that were singled out by the U.S. for their poor human rights 
records with Argentina receiving one-fourth of all opposing votes. 
 In a survey that spanned the Carter administration as well as the first Reagan 
administration, David Forsythe (1988) argued that although the Carter administration was 
not enthusiastic about section 701 of the IFI act, viewing it as a constraint on Executive 
authority, it did vote against numerous loans in the MDBs on human rights grounds.  
During the first Reagan administration however a double standard emerged from using 
the provision primarily against certain left-wing governments while voting for loans to 
right wing or authoritarian governments (Forsythe 1988).  Glenn Mower Jr. (1987) finds 
a similar pattern in both the Carter and Reagan administrations.  He also notes that 
Congress amended language to section 701 to remove the word “consistent” from the 
legislation making it more difficult for the Reagan administration to justify its votes by 
arguing that those regime were not engaged in consistent pattern of human rights 
violations (Mower Jr. 1987). In summary, this brief literature points out that U.S. votes 
against loans for human rights reasons had a distinct Cold War bias in that the recipient 
state’s ideology as well as its relationship with the U.S. appears to be the primary reasons 
for the no votes, with human rights a secondary concern.  
 
 Human Rights and U.S. Bilateral Aid 
 One limitation of this literature review is that all of the works under review 
examine the time period from 1977 to the late 1980s and primarily rely on descriptive 
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statistics without testing the full array of variables that may determine U.S. votes in the 
MDBs. In contrast to the thin literature on U.S. human rights policy and multilateral aid 
there is an extensive literature on the place of human rights in U.S. bilateral aid.  An 
overview of this literature focusing specifically on the post-Cold War era supplies 
additional variables that enable a more fully specified overall test of the place of human 
rights in recent U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs. 
 Meernik et. al’s (1998) expansive study suggests that three broad factors govern 
the distribution of foreign aid.  The first are systemic factors, which primarily encompass 
national security concerns.    The second are societal factors that include liberal economic 
and free market policies driven by domestic business interests.  The third category 
includes ideological concerns regarding democracy promotion, human rights, and 
development.  They conclude that since the end of the Cold War security factors have 
declined in importance while ideological concerns have increased in importance. 
Specifically they found that human rights were significant in determining whether a 
country received aid from the U.S. However, for those countries that did receive aid, 
those countries with worse human rights records tended to receive a greater amount of aid 
than those countries with better human rights records.  They speculate that once a country 
passes some basic minimum standard of human rights protection they are not punished 
for the less severe violations they may commit (Meernik et. al. 1998). 
 Apodaca and Stohl (1999) expanded the scope of previous works on U.S. aid and 
human rights by including a larger sample of countries (140) and also by examining the 
Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations in addition to the Carter and Reagan 
administrations.  They found that at the gatekeeping stage (the initial stage at which it is 
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decided whether a country receives aid or not) human rights did matter for whether a 
country received U.S. aid or not, except during the Clinton administration.  In addition, 
human rights were important in determining the amount of aid a country received - 
countries with awful human rights records (as measured by respect for rights of personal 
integrity) received less aid.  Despite the positive assessment of the role human rights 
played in the distribution of U.S. economic aid, Apodaca and Stohl (1999) also found that 
national security interests (defined by US military presence) played a greater role, with 
countries viewed as important to U.S. national security receiving aid despite their record 
on human rights.   
More recent scholarship on the question of human rights and U.S. bilateral aid has 
become more complex both substantively and methodologically.  Lai (2003) for instance 
focuses on the gate keeping stage of bilateral aid by looking at the initial disbursement of 
aid as opposed to who receives aid each year. He found human rights only predicted the 
initial amount of aid a state was allocated and this was only significant after the Cold War 
(Lai, 2003). The most recent scholarship posits that the influence of human rights on 
bilateral aid decisions is dependent on both the regime type of the recipient country and 
its level of economic development (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz, 2009).  Specifically, 
they find that human rights are not an important determinant of U.S. aid for countries 
transitioning to democracy or established democracies, nor are they an important 
determinant for economically underdeveloped countries as measured by GDP per capita.  
They did find that human rights are an important determinant of aid going to autocracies, 
with autocracies that have poor human rights records receiving less aid (Demirel-Pegg 
and Moskowitz 2009).  
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From the literature review one can see that over time human rights have been an 
important but uneven component of U.S. foreign aid policy, becoming more of a factor in 
the post-Cold War environment. More specifically, what these studies show is that 
economic and security concerns often take priority over human rights norms as a 
determinant of aid.  The shift in the international security environment away from 
bipolarity after the Cold War has somewhat changed the content of those priorities, as 
well as their importance. The next issue to consider is exactly what the MDBs do and 
how they operate.  The next section looks at how the MDBs are organized and how the 
operate with particular reference to the role the U.S. plays in MDB operations. 
 
Overview of MDBs: 
Multilateral development banks are international institutions comprised of 
member states and dedicated to the alleviation of poverty through the financing of 
development projects in poor countries.  Towards that end the MDBs generally engage in 
three types of activities.  First, their traditional activity is providing financing for large-
scale investment projects that are deemed important for development.  Originally, much 
of this investment focused on large infrastructure projects such as transportation, utilities 
and communication.  The emphasis during this time was on physical assets that would 
generate recoverable revenue making the projects self-liquidating (Kapur et. al. 1997).  
Later on the mandate of the MDBs expanded, starting with the World Bank, and the 
investment strategy grew broader and carried a specific poverty reduction focus (Sanford 
1982).  In the last decade or so the MDBs lending portfolio has shifted towards social 
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development projects – health, education, creation of social safety net – over traditional 
infrastructure investments (Lyne et. al 2009).   
Second, the MDBs also provide loans for policy reforms.  These are non-project 
loans with conditions attached that provides governments with financing in exchange for 
specific domestic policy reforms.  Policy-based lending emerged in the MDBs for three 
reasons.  First, as a response to the debt crisis, and second oil crisis, which required 
substantial and fast lending.  Second, in response to mounting evidence that a recipient 
country’s governing and policy environment was critical to the success of development 
projects and in an attempt to induce change in borrowing countries, the MDBs started to 
offer these conditional loans.  Finally, the fungibility of money lent to recipient countries 
necessitated the evaluation of a countries total investment program (Williamson 2005).  
This was done in an attempt to ensure some measure of accountability for the money that 
was lent to borrowing states.  The funds for these projects are usually distributed in 
installments to ensure that governments are complying with the attached conditions.  The 
most controversial non-project lending program is the World Bank’s Structural 
Adjustment Facility since it promotes market liberalization and the privatization of 
services in borrowing countries (Babb 2009).  In fact research suggests that World Bank 
structural adjustment lending has actually worsened the human rights situation in 
recipient states since the conditions attached to the loans require reductions in public 
expenditures that hurt the poor leading to increased social conflict and inviting harsh 
government responses to quell the unrest (Abouhard and Cingranelli 2006).   
Finally, the MDBs also conduct and disseminate research on development.  This 
is especially true for the World Bank, which produces a large quantity of scholarly 
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research on development every year; and this research is highly influential in both the 
academic and development spheres (Babb 2009).   World Bank research on development 
informs the policies of bilateral development agencies and the lending policies of the 
World Bank itself, as well as the policies of the other MDBs  (Babb 2009).  Although the 
development research conducted and disseminated by the MDBs, especially the World 
Bank, is very influential it is not above criticism.  For example, World Bank research has 
been criticized for promulgating a neoliberal approach to development that reflects the 
influence of the U.S. and the western economics training of its staff (Wade 2002; Weaver 
2008).   
 
 MDBs: Background 
There are five major development banks operating today.  The World Bank, 
founded in 1944, is by far the largest lender, distributing billions of dollars a year in low-
interest loans and grants to the poorest countries in the world.  The World Bank was 
established during the Bretton Woods conference along with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to plan the post World War II financial architecture.  The original purpose of 
the World Bank was to provide financing for the reconstruction of Europe but this was 
subsequently supplanted when the U.S. took on that role with the Marshall Plan.  The 
World Bank then quickly shifted its focus towards economic development and poverty 
reduction in the developing world.  Over the years the organization has evolved to what is 
known as the World Bank group, which includes a total of four lending windows 
specializing in specific lending programs.  In addition, the World Bank evolved from an 
organization that focused on large-scale infrastructure investment projects, to an 
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organization involved with a wide variety of investments including social and policy 
lending, allowing the organization to slowly encroach upon the domestic politics of the 
recipient countries. 
In addition to the World Bank there are four regional banks.  The Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) was established in 1959 to support economic development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and is the longest serving regional development bank 
in operation.  In contrast to the World Bank, the IDB’s mandate from the beginning 
included broad support for social lending and targeted assistance to the poor, and only 
started to devote attention to large-scale infrastructure projects during the 1970s (Babb 
2009).  The U.S. initially resisted the creation of the IDB for several years but eventually 
came to support the creation of the institution.   Three broad factors helped push for its 
creation.  First, there was the motivation among Latin American countries to limit the 
influence of foreigners in their economic affairs and to give themselves more authority 
over their own economic development.  Second, there was a belief that the World Bank, 
and bilateral aid donors, who were devoting their resources to other regions of the world, 
were slighting Latin American countries.  The creation of the IDB was meant to rectify 
this imbalance.  Finally, Latin American countries were not in favor of the World Bank’s 
approach to development with its emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects.  They 
favored, and wanted, social lending as well as concessional lending (Sanford 1982).  One 
of the unique features of the IDB when it was developed was its soft loan window, which 
lends at a greatly reduced interest rate over a long period of time.  Subsequent MDBs, 
including the World Bank, developed soft loan windows as well but the IDB was the only 
Bank that has included one since it’s founding.  The IDB is also unique among the other 
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regional development bank in that its headquarters are not located in its region but in 
Washington D.C., which has lead to concerns that the IDB is subject to undue U.S. 
influence (Strand 2003).  However the borrowing states in the IDB have always exerted a 
fair amount of influence in the organization (Tussie 1995). 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) is located in Tunis, Tunisia and was 
established in 1964.  In contrast to the other development banks, the push to create the 
institution came from African countries themselves and not wealthy donor states such as 
the U.S.  Initially the membership of the AfDB was limited to African states and 
represented broad notions of pan-Africanism that were prevalent during the postcolonial 
era after World War II.  The AfDB was to represent “Africanicity” in its operations, 
membership, and lending activities.  This ideology had important symbolic meaning to 
showcase an African institution that was successful and successfully run by Africans 
themselves without western influence (Mingst 1990). 
  Closely following its founding the AfDB faced a financial shortfall.  Because of 
the poor economic performance in African at the time the AfDB’s creditworthiness 
suffered and its bonds were unable to generate capital to lend.  Because of this the AfDB 
eventually opened its membership to wealthy donor states such as the U.S., which first 
joined the AfDB’s concessional lending window and then a few years later joined the 
hard loan window.  In the mid-1990s the AfDB again faced financial problems as some 
of the non-African members lost faith in the institution.  One reason for this crisis was 
that as some of the recipient country’s creditworthiness was declining they were still 
receiving non-concessional loans.  This led the AfDB into significant arrears and in 1994 
the AfDB essentially shut down its lending operations.  In an effort to differentiate itself 
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in a crowded aid environment the AfDB has recently started to focus on those areas in 
which it can be most effective, including infrastructure projects and leaving other issues, 
such as AIDS policy, to different institutions such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations (Weiss 2008).    
The Asian Development Bank (AsDB) was established in 1965 and is 
headquartered in Manila.  Much like the other regional development banks the idea for 
the AsDB emerged from the countries in the region.  The U.S. was initially reluctant to 
support the institution but quickly came around to supporting it as the war in Vietnam 
started to escalate.  In April 1965 President Johnson advocated for economic 
development as a means to support peace in Southeast Asia and subsequently threw U.S. 
support behind the creation of the AsDB.  President Johnson’s advocacy of the AsDB 
was meant to indicate continued U.S. engagement with the Vietnam War and signal that 
the U.S. was determined to maintain long-term influence in the region (Sanford 1982; 
Culpepper 1994).   
The AsDB, much like the World Bank, originally focused on financing 
infrastructure projects and later shifted to more broad based poverty reduction and 
economic development strategies.  The Asian financial crisis in 1997 drove the AsDB to 
re-evaluate its role as many of its members were severely effected by the crisis including, 
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.  By the end of 1999 the AsDB 
exclaimed that poverty reduction was its primary mission thereby establishing the shift in 
lending priorities that had been developing over the past few decades (Weiss 2004).  One 
unique feature of the AsDB compared to the other MDBs is the equal influence of both 
the United States and Japan.  Japan was as influential as the U.S. in the creation of the 
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AsDB and made an initial contribution that was equal to the U.S. contribution.  The 
AsDB was one of the first international institutions in which Japan asserted a leadership 
role and has used the institution to achieve some international prestige (Strand 1999).  
Also, friction between the two countries has been minimal in the institution as they both 
broadly support the same goals for the institution (Babb 2009).   
Finally, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was 
established in 1991 to assist Eastern European countries transition from Communism.  
The immediate post Communist era in Central and Eastern Europe was a time of rapid 
political and social change.  It was within this complex international environment that the 
EBRD formed.  Emerging from this distinct regional environment the EBRD gained an 
explicitly political agenda to go along with its economic development agenda.  
Specifically, its political agenda is to promote democracy in the former communist 
countries of Eastern Europe (Strand 2003).   
The political, and economic, agenda of the EBRD developed because the 
institution is actually embedded in already established overlapping institutions in Europe, 
such as the European Union and NATO.  Steven Weber (1994: 34) describes the EBRD 
as “the first self-consciously political and European international institution of the post-
Cold War world, it represents an outward-looking partial alliance among states that share 
a basic orientation toward democratic standards linked to commitments about the 
principal role of market competition and ultimately the private-sector in economic and 
political development.”  Because of its unique origins the EBRD has five core 
components to its mandate that distinguish it from the other MDBs.  First, political 
factors will greatly influence lending decisions.  Second, the institution will work closely 
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with private firms in financing projects.  Third, the environmental impact of a project will 
be factored into the lending decision.  Fourth, the EBRD has tools at its disposal that 
other MDBs do not, such as the ability to take an equity share, demand sovereign 
guarantees, and underwrite security offerings.  Finally, the Bank has a role in providing 
advice to governments transitioning from Communism to Capitalism on privatization and 
other economic issues (Weber 1994; Strand 2003).   
More so than the other MDBs, The EBRD acts like a private bank in that it does a 
lot of its lending to private interests.  In fact, the EBRD does not have a soft loan window 
– a institution that focuses on concessional lending, i.e., lending at almost zero interest 
with a repayment term that spans decades.  The U.S., and in particular the first Bush 
Administration, wanted the EBRD to focus exclusively on private lending but that 
proposal met with resistance from some European countries.  The compromise was set to 
allow only up to 40 percent of EBRD lending for traditional infrastructure and public 
works lending, which is the bread and butter of the other MDBs (Babb 2009).   
 
 MDBs: Lending 
The MDBs, and specifically the World Bank, are the primary source of 
development assistance to the less developed countries of the world.  Each of the MDBs, 
excluding the EBRD, has at least two lending windows through which funds are 
distributed (see Table 2.1 for full list of lending windows for each bank).  The “hard 
loan” windows are where loans are made at near market rates but with longer repayment 
periods than are offered by commercial banks.  The majority of MDB projects are 
financed through the hard loan windows.  The interest rates on projects financed through 
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these windows are flexible but they usually vary by a half percentage more than what the 
MDBs pay to get the funds originally.  The repayment period is also variable depending 
on the project and the institution making the loan but generally it varies from between 12 
to 25 years (Sanford 2001a).   One of the original purposes of the World Bank was to 
mitigate imperfections in the world capital markets and channel funds to countries and 
projects which were likely to have a high rate of return but were perceived as risky and 
thus causing private capital to stay away (Upton 2000).  The hard loan windows were 
meant to remedy this problem.   
 
Table 2.1 Multilateral Development Banks and Lending Windows 
Bank Window 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) – Hard Loan 
Window 
International Development Association 
(IDA) – Soft Loan Window 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) – 
Private Sector Affiliate  
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) – Export Insurance 
 
 
 
 
 
The World Bank Group 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) – 
Environmental projects financing 
African Development Bank (AfDB) – Hard 
Loan Window 
African Development Fund (AfDF) – Soft 
Loan Window 
 
The African Development Bank 
Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) – Specific Soft 
Loan Window 
Asian Development Bank (AsDB) – Hard 
Loan Window 
 
The Asian Development Bank 
Asian Development Fund (AsDF) – Soft 
Loan Window 
Ordinary Capital (OC) – Hard Loan 
Window 
 
 
 
 
Fund for Special Operations (FSO) – Soft 
Loan Window 
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Inter-American Investment Corporation 
(IIC) – Private Sector Affiliate 
The Inter-American Development Bank 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) – 
Grant Facility 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) – Government and 
Private Sector Hard Loan Window 
  
The second type of lending windows are known as “soft loan” windows, which 
lend at heavily subsidized, or concessional, rates to the poorest countries with repayment 
terms of 40 years or more.  As a result, concessional loans are not profitable for MDBs so 
they have to rely on donor contributions to make up for the shortfall.  This is in contrast 
to hard loans, which have interest rates that allow the MDBs to recoup the loan. These 
soft loan windows are perhaps better described as aid vehicles rather than lending 
programs (Upton 2000).   Not all member states of the MDBs are eligible for soft loan or 
concessional lending.  For example, the International Development Association (IDA) is 
the soft loan facility of the World Bank, and eligibility for IDA lending depends 
ultimately on a country’s relative poverty.  Measuring a country’s gross national income 
per capita and comparing it to an annual threshold, which in 2010 was $1,135, determines 
eligibility.   In 2010 seventy-nine countries were eligible for IDA resources (World Bank 
2011).   
In addition to these two basic lending windows, both the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank have separate windows for lending to private 
enterprises in developing countries. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) are the main private sector windows in the 
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank respectively. This lending is done 
primarily through the financing and equity investments in private sector enterprises and 
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specifically in the case of the IIC in small and medium enterprises (USGAO 2001).  The 
IDB also has a second private sector lending window the Multilateral Investment Fund 
(MIF), which was established in 1993 and specifically provides financing for 
microenterprises and small businesses. 
Although the hard loan windows of each MDB can also lend to the private sector 
the majority of that lending goes to governments (except in the EBRD), which makes 
these additional private sector windows useful.  In addition, a private sector lending 
window like the IFC can also provide financing for private sector projects without having 
a government secure the investment, which is specifically prohibited in both the hard loan 
and soft loan windows in the World Bank (Weaver 2008).  The purpose of these lending 
windows is to further economic growth through the development of the private sector. 
The World Bank has an additional window for political risk insurance, the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which provides insurance for foreign investment 
in developing countries.  Ultimately, like the IFC, the MIGA is meant to help channel 
foreign capital to the developing world.  The final component of the World Bank is the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is not a 
lending window but a dispute settlement and arbitration agency used to help solve 
investment disagreements (Weaver 2008).  
 
 MDBs: Organization  
According to Sarah Babb (2009: 23), the MDBs are “members of a common 
family and share family traits.” In other words, the MDBs are separate organizations but 
they share many common characteristics especially when it comes to their organization 
  
52 
and decision-making structure.  Despite the fact that all the MDBs share similar 
characteristics the World Bank serves as kind of a leader among these institutions.  Since 
the World Bank was the first multilateral development bank the subsequent regional 
development banks generally adopted the same organizational structure.  Also, many of 
the changes in lending patterns that have occurred throughout the MDBs (such as the 
development of policy based lending) began with the World Bank and migrated to the 
other MDBs. 
The MDBs are staffed and run by international civil servants but the main 
supervisory bodies of the MDBs - the Boards of Governors and the Boards of Executive 
Directors -- represent member state governments.  The Board of Governors is the senior 
decision making body for each institution and they usually meet annually to develop an 
overall strategic vision for the organization.  Much of the decision-making of the Board 
of Governors has been delegated to the Executive Boards, but the Board of Governors 
still maintains control over major factors such as membership decisions, whether to 
increase or decrease the capital stock, and whether to alter the Articles of Agreement.  In 
general, the Board of Governors bear responsibility for making decisions on the broad 
scope of MDB operations (USGAO 2001).     
The Executive Board is where the vast majority of decision-making occurs within 
the MDBs.  The members of the Executive Board, known as Executive Directors (ED), 
serve a dual role in that they represent their member county but they also act as 
international civil servants (Woods 2006).  The Executive Board for each institution 
usually meets on a weekly basis and makes decisions on lending and policy proposals.  In 
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addition, they also handle the general administrative and budgetary matters and oversee 
general bank activity (USGAO 2001).  
Member country representation differs for both the Board of Governors and the 
Executive Boards.  Each member country has a governor on the Board of Governors, 
which is not the case with the Executive Boards. In the Executive Boards the most 
economically important member states have their own EDs while the less powerful states 
must share an ED.  For example, in the World Bank countries such as the U.S., the U.K., 
Germany, and France have their own ED, while Mexico, Spain, Venezuela and other 
Central American states share a single ED (Babb 2009).   This requires an ED that 
represents a group of countries to discern a consensus among the countries they represent 
as to how to vote on specific issues. Generally speaking, each window of each MDB has 
a separate Executive Board but often it is the same Executive Director who represents 
each country or group of countries on the different boards.  The number of EDs on each 
board varies by institution  (see Table 2.2 for number of EDs in each Bank) 
 
Table 2.2 Executive Directors (2010) 
Bank Total # of 
Executive 
Directors 
Regional 
Members 
Represent 2 or 
more Countries 
Represent one 
country 
World Bank 25 NA 20 
5 (U.S., Japan, 
Germany, 
France, U.K.) 
IDB 14 10 12 
2 (U.S., 
Canada) 
AsDB 12 8 10 2 (U.S., Japan) 
AfDB 18 12 17 1 (U.S.) 
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EBRD 23 19 15 
8 (Italy, 
France, EIB, 
Japan, U.S., 
EU, U.K., 
Germany) 
 
 MDB: Decision Making 
Both formal and informal procedures guide the decision-making process in the 
Executive Board.  The formal voting rules of the MDBs are generally the same with some 
slight variation across each of the institutions.  Voting rules were one of the major areas 
of concern during the Bretton Woods negotiations that established the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Neither of these institutions use the “one 
country, one vote” model employed by the United Nations, but rather they have a system 
of weighted voting based on quotas, which represent a country’s economic significance, 
and translate that into voting shares (Woods 2006).  Voting shares represent a country’s 
percentage of the total votes in the institution (see Table 2.3 for U.S. voting shares in the 
MDBs).  
 
Table 2.3 U.S. Contributions and Voting Shares in the MDBs 
 
 Bank 
 
Contribution Share % 
 
Voting Share % 
World Bank 
IBRD 
IDA 
IFC 
MIGA 
 
16.8 
22.1 
24.1 
18.9 
 
16.4 
11.2 
23.6 
15.1 
AsDB 
AsDB 
AsDF 
 
15.6 
12.6 
 
12.8 
12.8 
EBRD 10.1 9.8 
IADB 
IDB 
 
30.3 
 
30.0 
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FSO 
IIC 
MIF 
50.5 
25.5 
39.4 
30.0 
25.1 
29.1 
AfDB 
AfDB 
AfDF 
 
6.4 
12.7 
 
6.4 
6.1 
 
The World Bank also uses the same quota that provides the basis for a country’s 
voting share in the IMF.  This is significant because the current quota used by the IMF is 
supposed to represent a countries contribution to the world economy, but there are 
significant political factors that go into determining a country’s IMF quota (Rapkin and 
Strand 2005; 2006).  IMF quota size is partially determined by a complex weighted 
formula that includes a country’s GDP, exports, imports and financial reserves.  The 
quota determined by this formula has come under fire since it is not clear why certain 
variables are included, and others are left out.  It is also unclear what the quota is meant 
to represent.  Rapkin and Strand (2005: 1995) note that the, “single quota measure is 
supposed to accomplish multiple objectives: ability to contribute (GDP, reserves), access 
to resources according to need and vulnerability (as indicated by variability of export 
receipts), and voting weights as reflective of relative importance in the world economy 
(GDP).”   
To add to the confusion surrounding the calculation of the quota and what it is 
supposed to represent, the actual quotas used to assign voting shares are derived from 
negotiations that use the calculated quota only as a starting point (Rapkin and Strand 
2005).   In addition to the quota there are “basic votes” that each country gets for 
membership in the World Bank and IMF.  These “basic votes” are meant to give some 
minimum measure of voting weight to all member states  (See Table 2.4 for number of 
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basic votes in each MDB).  In the World Bank each state is given 250 votes plus one 
additional vote for each share of the Bank’s capital stock the country holds (which is 
represented by the quota) to determine their overall voting weight (World Bank 2010).   
 
Table 2.4 Number of Basic Votes in each MDB 
Bank Number of Basic Votes each country gets 
World 
Bank 
250 
AfDB 625 
IDB 135 
AsDB 20% of total 
EBRD No Basic Votes 
 
As was mentioned above, representation on the Executive Board of each of the 
MDBs is consolidated into “voting groups.”  These voting groups must elect one country 
to represent the group in the Executive Board.  The selection of a group representative is 
done using a simple majority.  The catch, however, is that in some of the voting groups 
certain members act as “dictators”, and essentially ensure their own selection as the 
group’s representative (Strand 2001).  In certain voting groups some member states by 
themselves constitute a majority of the voting shares and therefore are able to in effect 
select themselves as representatives.  For example, in the African Development Bank 
Algeria, Guinea Bissau, and Madagascar together comprise one voting group.  The total 
shares owned by that group of countries is 103,991, which means to be “elected” to 
represent that group in the Executive Board one country has to get a majority of those 
103,991 shares.  In this group Algeria effectively acts as a dictator able to select itself as 
the group’s representative since it has 87, 979 of the 103,991 voting shares.  Guinea 
Bissau and Madagascar have 1,225 and 14,787 shares respectively (African Development 
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Bank 2010).  The result of this is that many members of the MDBs have virtually no 
formal influence in the MDB Executive Boards.   
This system of weighted voting combined with the fact that most countries are 
represented in groups on the Executive Boards in the MDBs gives way to a variety of 
majority combinations that make passage, or approval, of projects possible.  Also it 
shows that one cannot discern from a country’s voting weight alone how much influence 
or power that country has in the institution.  Instead one must look at the country’s 
relative voting power i.e. ability to determine winning coalitions to asses how influential 
that country is (Strand 1999; 2001; 2003; 2003a).    
Another aspect of the formal rules in the MDBs that bears mentioning are special 
majorities, which are required for the passage of certain items.  In general, a simple 
majority is enough for the approval of loans and projects in the Executive Board.  For 
major issues, which are usually decided by the Board of Governors, super majorities are 
often required.  For example to add new members or increase the capital stock in the IDB 
requires 75% approval.  In addition some of these special majorities ensure that no major 
changes will be made without the approval of the largest shareholders.  For example in 
the EBRD many of the major decisions of the Board of Governors require two-thirds 
approval but also three-fourths of the total voting power.  So in other words if two-thirds 
of the member states approve of a change in the Board of Governor’s in the EBRD the 
change will only be made if that two-thirds also represents three-fourths of the total 
voting power  (Carrasco et al. 2009).  This significantly benefits the largest contributors 
to this institution since there support is necessary for any changes to be made.   
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Along with the formal rules of the MDBs, informal procedures also play a 
significant role in how decisions are made.  The decisions made in both the Board of 
Governors and the Executive Board are based on consensus with formal votes only taken 
on rare occasions.  The use of the consensus decision-making process makes examining 
the dynamics of decision making in both places difficult since the formal counting of 
votes is rare.  Also because of the consensus decision-making requirement much of the 
politicking on decisions takes place before the Executive Boards meet, making it difficult 
to observe horse-trading and other political dynamics that occur in all political bodies 
(Woods 2006). 
Despite the fact that formal votes are rarely taken, the decisions on loan projects 
take place in what Lyne et al. (2009: 413) describe as, “the shadow of the formal majority 
rule.”  What this means is that the vast majority of the projects that come before the 
Executive Board for formal approval are those that are likely to gain majority approval.  
In other words, projects that are unlikely to garner majority support among the EDs on 
the Executive Board are not brought before the board for approval.  The professional staff 
and administrators of the MDBs often work with potential borrowing states in crafting 
proposals, and the MDB and borrower agree upon the terms of the loan or credit before it 
is brought before the Executive Board for approval.  It is early on in this loan 
development/approval process where potential projects are scuttled if EDs informally 
express reservations regarding the project (Lyne et. al. 2009).  The United States is 
particularly involved in this process.  Members of the USED staff work closely with 
MDB staff and with borrowing countries on developing projects.  This is especially the 
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case in the World Bank since the institution is located in Washington D.C., giving the 
Banks staff access to U.S. policymakers (Interview State Department Official 2011). 
 
 MDBs: Funding 
The operational resources for the MDBs come from contributions from member 
states, interest from bonds issued on capital markets, and interest paid on loans (loan 
reflows) (Babb 2009).  Lending in the MDBs is financed from two sources.  Hard loans 
are financed from money borrowed on international capital markets.  The MDBs can 
borrow at favorable rates since they have financial backing from capital subscribed to 
them by member states.  A small portion of this capital is paid by member states (known 
as paid in capital) while the rest is guaranteed (known as callable capital) if necessary, 
although the reliance on callable capital from member states has never been used 
(Sanford 2001a; Babb 2009).  Callable capital cannot be used to fund new obligations 
(i.e. fund new loan proposals) but only to pay off current obligations.  Callable capital 
allows the MDBs to borrow on favorable terms on world capital markets to finance its 
loans and this allows the MDBs to lend at much greater rates than the amount of actual 
paid in capital the MDBs receive (USGAO 2001).    
Callable capital is similar to a promissory note in that it represents an agreement 
by member states to pay MDB debts if the institution cannot pay its debt through the 
other means available to it.  If an MDB found itself in the position in which it was 
necessary to make a call on its callable capital to pay off a debt it would need to make 
calls until it received enough money to meet its payment.  Since member states contribute 
different rates of callable capital independent of each other they have different 
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obligations when a call is made.  In other words no state is required to pay more than the 
callable capital it has already promised (USGAO 2001).   
 The soft (or concessional) loans are financed through contributions from member 
states.  Since these loans are not usually profitable for the MDBs these funds have to be 
periodically replenished (Sanford 2001a; Babb 2009).  The upside of concessional 
lending by the MDBs is that it doesn’t require the institution to raise money on world 
capital markets and expose itself to interest rate risk.  On the other hand, the downside of 
concessional lending is that, since it is lending to the least developed and poorest 
countries, it opens the MDBs up to the credit risks of their borrowers (USGAO 2001).   
Because concessional loans require periodic replenishment this opens up a door for 
politics it enter into MDB decision-making.  This was one of the major concerns during 
the build up to the creation of the World Bank’s soft loan window, the IDA. 
This overview of the MDBs highlights how these institutions were created and 
have evolved, how their lending policies work, their decision-making procedures, and 
how they are funded. It describes the specific institutional context in which the U.S. 
pursues its foreign policy objectives.  Although the U.S. exerts a significant amount of 
influence in the MDBs it is still constrained from pursuing some of its policy objectives 
in multilateral institutions.  The next chapter focuses specifically on the role of human 
rights in influencing U.S. voting behavior in the MDBs. 
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CHAPTER 3: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Research Design 
 Theoretical Framework: Human Rights and Strategic Interests 
The literature review showed that previous studies of U.S. foreign aid policy 
determined that strategic interests of the U.S. -- such as helping allies and promoting 
domestic economic prosperity -- competed with normative concerns, such as promoting 
human rights, to influence U.S. foreign aid policy. The question left unanswered is what 
is the relative importance of these goals in determining U.S. foreign aid policy?  In other 
words, are these mutually exclusive goals where strategic interests always trump 
normative goals or are there certain contexts where promoting human rights takes 
precedence over supporting allies or promoting economy prosperity?   
It is worth mentioning again that the division between strategic interests and 
normative values in U.S. foreign policy is not always clear.  This is specifically evident 
with human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  One can argue that promoting human rights is 
not only in accord with American values but also with America’s strategic interests.  
Joseph Nye essentially makes this point in his argument in favor of soft power.  
According to Nye, soft power is attractive power that can be used to create desired policy 
outcomes, and the sources of such power are often found in the values a country 
expresses (2004).  Following this logic one can argue that promoting human rights is 
connected to U.S. strategic interests to the extent that it creates soft power that allows the 
U.S. to achieve its goals, which would include ensuring national security and promoting 
the domestic economy.  A different version of this argument would be that promoting 
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human rights is a matter of strategic interests because the more countries that respect 
human rights the more secure the United States is (Schultz 2002).  Despite that fact that it 
is difficult to disentangle the difference between interests and values in U.S. foreign 
policy particularly with regards to promoting human rights it is still a useful analytical 
distinction to make and has theoretical support.   
With previously articulated caveat in mind, in this section I utilize a simple 
theoretical framework to identify how strategic interests and normative values influence 
U.S. foreign policy.  The framework was originally created as an explanation for U.S. 
asylum enforcement:  Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) developed a model of U.S. 
foreign policy to explain why the U.S. would chose to grant asylum to people from 
certain countries at certain times and for what reasons.  Asylum policy and multilateral 
aid policy are two different areas of U.S. foreign policy but they both are reflective of the 
underlying factors of normative and strategic interests.  The utility of Rosenblum and 
Salehyan’s model is in emphasizing the relative importance of those two factors in 
determining the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.   
The theoretical framework places U.S. votes in the MDBs along two axes: human 
rights and strategic interests (Figure 3.1).  The strategic interest axis measures the 
strategic importance of a country to the U.S.  The category of strategic interests is 
comprised of two components: helping allies and promoting domestic economic 
prosperity.  In strategic interest terms the U.S. supports loans to countries in the MDBs 
because those countries are important to the U.S. for security or economic reasons.  So 
the U.S. will support proposals to countries that it considers its allies (either formal or 
informal) and also support proposals to countries that are economically important to it.  
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On the strategic axis the areas to the right of the origin are given a positive value.  That 
means the country is strategically important to the U.S., which is inclined to support 
proposals to that country.  Negative values to the left of the origin on the strategic axis 
indicate the U.S. does not have strategic interests invested in that country, and may even 
be outright antagonistic towards it, and therefore will be more inclined to not support 
proposals to that country.  The human rights axis gauges the human rights record of the 
recipient states.  Above the origin on the human rights axis are positive values, which 
indicate the recipient country has a positive human rights record, and means the U.S. will 
be more inclined to support proposals to that country.  Below the origin on the human 
rights axis are negative values that indicate that the recipient country has a poor human 
rights record and implies that the U.S. will be less inclined to support proposals to that 
country.    
Human Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive I II 
Low 
Strategic 
Interests  
High 
III  Negative IV 
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Figure 3.1 Human Rights and Strategic Interests 
 
These two policy dimensions (human rights and strategic interests) create four 
quadrants in which recipient countries of MBD proposals can be placed.  The first 
quadrant (I) contains countries with positive human rights records that are also 
strategically important to the United States.  The second quadrant (II) contains those 
countries that have a positive human rights record but are not strategically important to 
the United States.  The third quadrant (III) contains countries that have neither a positive 
human rights record nor are of strategic importance to the U.S.  The fourth and final 
quadrant (IV) contains those countries, which are strategically important to the U.S. but 
have a poor human rights record.   
One can surmise that the U.S. will approve proposals to countries in quadrant I 
since those countries are both strategically important to the U.S. and have positive human 
rights record.  Conversely once can also surmise that the U.S. will not approve proposals 
for countries in quadrant III since those states are neither strategically important to the 
U.S. nor have a positive human rights record.  It is in quadrants II and IV in which more 
variation in U.S. approval may be seen.  In these two quadrants one can see to what 
extent strategic interests trump human rights or vice versa since they prescribe conflicting 
responses by the U.S.  Given the previous literature on U.S. voting in the MDBs one 
would conclude that strategic interests will trump human rights, but since the end of the 
Cold War that pattern has not been strongly reflected in bilateral aid allocation. So the 
same may hold in the MDBs.  From this theoretical perspective one can derive a variety 
of hypothesis to test 
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 Hypotheses 
 From the two-dimension theoretical framework used in this study one can derive 
two types of hypothesis: ones that test the human rights claims and ones that test the 
strategic interest claims.  Regarding the human rights claims the first hypothesis is:   
 H1: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries with poor human rights 
 records in the  MDBs 
 Turning to strategic interests that may influence U.S. votes in the MDBs I will test 
two hypothesis that touch on both dimensions of strategic interests: supporting allies and 
promoting domestic economic prosperity.  The first tests the economic connection 
between the recipient country and the U.S. through the volume of trade between the two 
states: 
 H2: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries with which it has a 
 lower volume of trade in the MDBs. 
The alliance component of the strategic interests dimension will be tested using two 
different measures: UN General Assembly voting similarity and military aid: 
 H3: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries that it does not have 
 a close  UN voting similarity with in the MDBs. 
 H4: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries to which it does not 
 give military aid in the MDBs. 
Finally, I hypothesize that the U.S. will support loans to poorer countries.  This may 
happen regardless of their human rights record or strategic interest to the U.S.  Since the 
purpose of multilateral aid is to channel money to the poorest states, and since the U.S. is 
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operating in these institutions, one can assume that the U.S. ultimately supports the 
raison d’être of the MDBs.  
 H5: The U.S. will be less likely to vote against poorer countries in the MDBs 
 
 Data Description 
This study will use pooled cross-sectional time series data of U.S. votes in the 
MDBs by country and year for a total of 9,766 observations.  The temporal dimension of 
the data ranges from 2004-2009 and the spatial dimension covers 165 countries, which 
includes the territories of the Canary Islands, Cook Islands, and the Palestinian West 
Bank and Gaza.  From 2004-2006 Serbia and Montenegro were considered the same but 
from 2007 onward they were considered separate in terms of votes in the MDBs.  There 
is also a Regional category, which includes votes on proposals that involved more than 
one country or region.3 The dataset is unbalanced since not every country seeks approval 
for projects in the MDBs every year. 
The data available for U.S. votes on MDB lending decisions range from 2004 to 
the present, so the time period under evaluation is somewhat limited.  The data are 
skewed toward the “yes” votes with the U.S. expressing approval for particular MDB 
decisions roughly 87% of the time.  However, since the number of observations overall is 
large there is enough variation in the dependent variable to enable meaningful inferences.  
This pattern is consistent with previous studies examining the U.S. MDB voting record 
during previous eras.  A participant in the inter-agency MDB policymaking process in the                                                         3 Those original regional votes in which all the individual countries that are a part of the 
proposal could be identified were disaggregated and a separate observation was created 
for each country.  Those original regional observations in which it was not established 
which countries were a part of the project were left as one regional observation. 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1970s recalled, “about 95% of the things that come up are no problem and go through 
very easily.  The other 5% caused all the difficulty.” (quoted in Sanford 2005: 4).  
Because such a small percentage of loan projects are rejected by the U.S., those that are 
rejected enhance the signal the U.S. is sending since it is used sparingly recipient states 
(and other states as well) must take notice.   
  The voting data is published by the Treasury Department on its website (2011) 
and it contains a brief description of the projects voted on, which Bank and Lending 
Window it was brought before, the date it was voted on, the amount of the loan, how the 
U.S. voted on the proposal (yes, no, abstain), and a reason code.  
 
 Variables 
 The main dependent variable used in this study is U.S. votes in the MDBs 
(USVOTE) by country and year. The range of vote choices available are yes, no, or 
abstain.  A “yes” vote expresses approval for the particular project under consideration 
while “no” and “abstain” can be collapsed into one category as they both indicate 
disapproval.  Therefore the dependent variable for U.S. votes on MDB lending decisions 
will be a dichotomous variable with “yes” = 1 and “no/abstain” = 0.  The reason for 
combining no and abstain votes into the same category is that they both signal 
disapproval and they both can ultimately lead to the rejection of a project.  Passage of any 
proposal in the MDBs is usually done by majority consensus (and in some cases super 
majority consensus) and therefore an abstention by the U.S. (or any other country) can be 
enough to prevent the passage of the proposal if the U.S. affirmative vote would have 
given the proposal majority approval.  Also, since yes votes are overwhelmingly the most 
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common response by the U.S. in the MDBs any deviation from that, whether a no vote or 
abstention, is a significant and purposeful action done with the intention of expressing 
disapproval.  
 The main independent variables are: human rights, supporting allies, promoting 
domestic economic prosperity, and level of development.  Human rights can be broken 
down into two components: personal integrity rights (PI) and political rights (POL).  
Personal integrity rights, “include the right to life and the inviolability of the human 
person.” (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009)  Examples of violations of rights of personal 
integrity include arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial killing and other violations of 
bodily integrity (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).  Political rights include rights to political 
participation, examples include freedom of speech, right to vote etc.  Political rights are 
often used as a measure of how democratic a country is (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).  
Although theoretically there is overlap between these two components of human rights, 
empirically one can find divergence.  There are countries that can show respect for one 
category of rights and not the other.  For example, there are democracies in the world that 
engage in arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killing and even torture, therefore showing 
more respect for one category of rights (political) and less respect for other rights 
(personal integrity)  (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). 
 I measure political rights using the Freedom House survey of government respect 
for political rights (Freedom House 2010).  The variable POL is the countries score on 
Freedom House’s measure of a country’s respect for political rights. The organization 
Freedom House releases an annual Freedom in the World survey, which rates countries 
on their respect for political rights on a 7-point scale with 1 indicating the highest level of 
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freedom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom.  Under Freedom House’s 
designation the category of political rights includes free and fair elections, ability to form 
political parties, and popular sovereignty (Freedom House 2006). 
 More specifically, on the political rights scale a 1 = a country with full electoral 
freedom, political parties are free to form, the political opposition has some power in 
government, and minorities are protected.  A 2 = less free than 1, there is some 
discrimination against minorities, there is some small amount of corruption or political 
violence, and the military or foreign governments may be weakening the quality of 
freedom.  A 3,4, or 5 = the same problems in category two except to a greater degree and 
also other threats to freedom such as civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, 
unfair elections, one party rule.  Countries in this category, however, also have some 
political rights such as the ability to organize some loose opposition and means to 
influence the government, which could include popular referendums etc.  6 = countries 
governed by autocrats, military juntas etc. and there is only the most minimum of 
political rights such as some small consideration of minorities and/or some tolerance for 
political discussion.  Category 7 = not free, meaning political rights are nonexistent also 
these countries exhibit extreme violence and perhaps even lack central governance 
(Freedom House 2006).  One criticism of Freedom House is that their measures are less 
reliable than other human rights measures since the organization has been less forthright 
about its source information for which it constructs its scales (Landman 2005).  Despite 
this it is still a widely used measure and correlates highly with other scales of political 
rights (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).  
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 Personal Integrity (PI) rights are operationalized using the Political Terror Scale 
(PTS), which uses U.S. State Department and Amnesty International country reports to 
create a 5-point scale of repression of personal integrity rights (Gibney et. al. 2010).  The 
personal integrity rights violations encompassed by the PTS include extrajudicial killing, 
torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment.  The PTS dataset captures violations 
of the rights of personal integrity along three dimensions: scope which includes the type 
of violence, intensity which refers to how frequent the violence is, and range which 
describes the percentage of the population targeted (Gibney et. al. 2010).   Again the PTS 
is a 5-point scale of political terror with a 5 indicating large-scale and indiscriminate 
repression and a 1 indicating countries with little to no threats to individual physical 
integrity.  More specifically, level 1 includes countries under secure rule of law and 
political imprisonment, torture, and political murder is extremely rare or non-existent.  
Level 2 includes countries where there is a small amount of political imprisonment and 
torture and political murder are rare.  Level 3 includes countries where political 
imprisonment is extensive, execution and political murder are common and unlimited 
detention occurs.  Level 4 includes countries in which the practices in Level 3 are 
increases.  Murder, disappearances, and torture are more common but the level of terror 
still mostly affects those involved in politics.  Finally, Level 5 includes countries where 
the level of terror exhibited in Level 4 is spread to the entire population and there are no 
limits on the leadership of the country in its pursuit of personal or political goals   (Wood 
and Gibney 2010).    
 Conceptually there is overlap between the measures of political rights and rights 
of personal integrity.  However, in terms of the scales used in this dissertation there is 
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actually very little overlap.  Previous studies that have used both Freedom House and the 
Political Terror Scale have also found little overlap in the measures (Hafner-Burton and 
Ron 2009).  The pearson correlation between the two scales used in this study is .433 (see 
Table 3.1) indicating that the two scales are measuring different measures of human 
rights. 
 Turning to strategic interests, I have hypothesized that the U.S. will be more 
supportive of proposals for countries that it considers allies (either formal or informal).  
Allies therefore is measured in two ways.  First is whether a country receives military aid 
(MILAID) from the U.S. or not.    Whether a country receives military aid from the U.S. 
or not is a good indicator of how important of an ally the U.S. perceives that country to 
be, or wants that country to be.  The reasons why the U.S. chooses to give military aid to 
recipient countries are often complex and multifaceted.  Usually military aid is given by 
the U.S. to exert some measure of influence in the recipient country, primarily in the 
name of national security.  Sometimes U.S. military aid achieves its intended results 
(U.S. influence) but often it only engenders a pushback from the recipient country to U.S. 
requests (Sullivan, Tessman, Li 2011).  Regardless of the result of the U.S. giving 
military aid the reason for giving it indicate that its purpose serves strategic interests by 
bringing foreign governments closer to the U.S. position.  In other words, if a country 
receives military aid from the U.S. that indicates a security relationship between the U.S. 
and the recipient country and therefore signals the country as a military ally (Rosenblum 
and Salehayn 2004).   
 With regards to military alliances the more prominent measure used in the foreign 
aid literature is the alliance data provided by the Correlates of War Project.  This is a 
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useful measure and may even be a better measure than military aid, however, the only 
problem is that it only goes to 2000 and the temporal dimension used in this study is from 
2004-2009.  As with previous studies which use U.S. military aid (Rosenblum and 
Salehayn 2004), I created a dummy variable coded 1 for countries that receive military 
aid from the U.S. and coded 0 for countries that do not. Military aid data is gathered from 
the US Overseas Loans and Grants (2010) document, otherwise known as the 
“Greenbook”, published annually by USAID.    
 In addition to receiving military aid, an ally is also operationalized using a 
country’s voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly (UNVOTE). 
Voting similarity in the UN General Assembly is a common measure to determine how 
close countries are politically (Kim and Russett 1996; Alesina and Dollar 1998; Gartzke 
1998; Voeten 2004). The use of similarity in General Assembly votes reveals a couple of 
interesting insights.  First, UN General Assembly votes provide a tangible measure of 
state preference, which is necessary to establish if one is trying to gauge how close they 
are politically (i.e. whether they are allied around common values and interests or not).  
Also, they show how difficult it might be for the U.S. to build multilateral coalitions to 
deal with international problems, which are a relatively inexpensive way of dealing with 
international issues (especially when compared with unilateral coercion) (Voeten 2004).   
 To determine which General Assembly votes are considered important to the U.S. 
I consult the United States Participation in the United Nations document (2010).  This 
document is produced annually by the State Department and identifies those votes in 
which direct U.S. interests are at stake, and votes in which the U.S. lobbied extensively.  
More specifically, it breaks down the votes across issue areas (e.g. human rights) and it 
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describes the efforts in which U.S. representative in the UN have tried to persuade other 
countries to support the U.S. position.  Narrowing the focus of UN General Assembly 
votes to only “important” votes provides a better measure of congruency between the 
U.S. and other countries since these votes are by definition ones that the U.S. feels the 
most strongly about and perceives its interests are on the line.  The measure itself then is 
constructed by taking the number of important votes in which the U.S. and the country in 
question voted identical (either both yes or both no) divided by the total number of 
important identical votes and important opposite votes (where the U.S. voted yes and the 
state in question voted no and vice versa).  The number then is the percentage of voting 
similarity between the U.S. and country in question on votes considered important by the 
U.S. and ranges from 0, indicating no similarity, to 100, indicating perfect similarity.   
 Economic importance is measured by the volume of trade (TRADE) a country has 
with the U.S., which is just the sum of U.S. exports to and imports from a recipient 
country in a given year. In the logit model a natural log scale is used for level of trade.  
Volume of trade is an appropriate measure of how important a country is economically to 
the U.S. The greater the trade volume between countries the greater the opportunity for 
slight variation in the volume of trade to influence the economic performance of each 
country therefore making them highly dependent on one another.  The export and import 
data comes from Correlates of War project for the years of 2003-2006 (Barbieri et al. 
2008).  For the years of 2007-2009 the data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau on 
foreign trade statistics (2010).   
 Finally, level of development (DEV) is measured using GDP per capita in U.S. 
dollars. As with level of trade, level of development is also transformed into a natural log 
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scale for the logit model.   GDP per capita provides both a measure of a country’s 
economic output and its level of development.  GDP per capita (or level of development) 
also serves as a proxy for recipient countries’ needs (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 
2009).  Or another way to state it is that GDP per capita represents the demand a country 
has for development projects.  Higher GDP per capita numbers would obviously 
represent less need or less demand and lower GDP per capita would represent more need 
or greater demand.  GDP per capita information comes from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook database (2010). Additionally, in keeping with the scholarly practice, all 
independent variables are lagged one year to reflect the information available to decision 
makers when voting decisions were made (Meernik et al. 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; 
Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009).  The correlation matrix for the 
independent variables is presented in Table 5. It shows little correlation between the 
independent variables. 
 
Table 3.1 Correlation Matrix 
  POL PI MILAID UNVOTE (ln)TRADE (ln)DEV 
POL 1.0000      
PI 0.3797 1.0000     
MILAID -0.0802 -0.0176 1.0000    
UNVOTE -0.4422 -0.3496 0.0648 1.0000   
(ln)TRADE -0.0730 0.3566 -0.1320 -0.1082 1.0000  
(ln)DEV -0.3181 -0.2198 -0.0477 0.2733 0.5100 1.0000 
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 Methodology 
 To test my hypothesis I use logit analysis. Dichotomous dependent variables 
create problems for statistical inferences using linear regression.  Logistic regression, on 
the other hand, can transform non-linear relationships into linear relationships allowing 
one to make valid statistical inferences (Pampel 2000).  When using pooled time-series 
cross-sectional data two issues that often arise are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
The main concern with cross-sectionally dominant pooled time-series cross-sectional data 
is heteroskedasticity. The most important assumption of time-series cross-sectional 
analysis is pooling, which is the notion that “all units are characterized by the same 
regression equation at all points in time.” (Beck and Katz 1995: 636)  This assumption 
can create issues with the error terms.  Homoskedasticity is the assumption that all the 
errors have the same variance, or all the errors are independent from one another. When 
dealing with cross-national data it is likely that the errors will not be independent as 
situations that occur in one country often have spillover effects that influence other 
countries.  In the area of human rights one can imagine two countries involved in conflict 
with each other might both see their record on human rights deteriorate due to the 
conflict.  To account for potential heteroskedasticity I will employ robust standard errors 
(White 1980).   The logit equation is as follows: 
 
 USVOTEit = β0 + β1POLit-1 + βPIit-1 + βMILAIDit-1 + βUNGAVOTEit-1 + 
 βln(TRADE)it-1  + βln(DEV)it-1 + εit 
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Where USVOTEit represents the voting decision by the U.S. in the MDBs. POLit-1 and PIit-
1 correspond to political and personal integrity rights respectively, while MILAIDit-1 
relates to military aid and UNGAVOTEit-1 voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN.  
Finally, ln(TRADE)it-1 represents the level of trade between the U.S. and the recipient 
country and ln(DEV)it-1 represents the level of development of the recipient country. 
 
Results 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Before reporting the results of the logit model, Table 3.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the independent variables used.  In total there are 9,022 observations in the 
full model.  The mode for U.S. votes is 1 and the mean is 87 percent.  The median for the 
political rights variable (POL) is 3 on the 1-7 Freedom House scale and the mean is 3.9.  
The median for the rights of personal integrity variable (PI) is 3 on the 1-5 Political 
Terror Scale and the mean is 3.2.  The mode for military aid (MILAID) is 1 while the 
mean is .80.  The mean for voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN (UNVOTE) is 29 
percent.  The median level of trade (TRADE) is $2,562 as measured in $US millions, 
however the mean for level of trade is $27,117 reflects the high level of trade between the 
U.S. and China which skews the distribution. The mean for level of development (DEV) 
is $3,011 measured as per capita GDP and the median for level of development is $1933 
per capita GDP.  
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 Logit Estimation Results  
 The results of the logit estimation are found in Table 3.3.  The results show that 
respect for political rights (POL), whether the country receives military aid from the U.S. 
(MILAID); voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN (UNVOTE), and; level of economic 
development (lnDEV) are all significant predictors of U.S. votes in the MDBs.  Respect 
for rights of personal integrity (PI) and level of trade with the U.S. (lnTRADE) were not 
significant predictors.  The likelihood of the U.S. voting yes in the MDBs is negatively 
influenced by a decrease in respect for political rights. In other words, as the level of 
respect for political rights diminishes, the likelihood that the U.S. will vote for projects 
going to that country also diminishes.  The log odds of respect for political rights is          
-0.348, which means every one unit increase in lack of respect for political rights 
Variable Obs Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Min Max 
USVOTE 9766 0.865554 1 1 0.3411484 0 1 
POL 9300 3.721914 3 3 1.874803 1 7 
PI 9222 3.204186 3 3 0.9133669 1 5 
MILAID 9380 0.7979744 1 1 0.4015326 0 1 
UNVOTE 9234 29.24429 25 0 22.68708 0 100 
TRADE 9198 27117.52 2562.35 2072.12 77514.81 0 407505.4 
DEV 9220 3011.735 1933.74 5325.82 3053.336 82.64 32926.95 
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decreases the logged odds of the U.S. voting yes in the MDBs by 0.348.  The coefficient 
for military aid is 1.000 indicating that for countries that receive military aid from the 
U.S. the log odds of the U.S. voting yes increase by 1.000.  The coefficient for UN voting 
similarity indicates that for every one-unit increase in voting similarity the log odds of the 
U.S. voting yes decreases by -0.013.  This is not in the hypothesized direction but the 
effect is also quite small.    Finally, the coefficient for level of development indicates that 
for every one unit increase in level of development the log odds of the U.S. voting yes in 
the MDBs decreases by 0.253.      
 
Table 3.3 Logit Estimation: Log Odds 
Variable Coefficient 
  
POL -0.3480592*** 
 (.0503003) 
PI 0.0456007 
 (.0929855) 
MILAID 1.000852*** 
 (.1868296) 
UNVOTE -.0127865*** 
 (.0037732) 
(ln)TRADE .035066 
 (.05058) 
(ln)DEV -0.252843** 
 (.0911212) 
  
N 9022 
Pseudo R2 0.0757 
Wald Chi2 81.13 
   
Note: Model estimated using Logistic regression.  Robust standard errors clustered 
     around country years included in parenthesis 
     ***p≤0.001 **p≤0.01 * p≤0.10 
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 The difficulty in interpreting the logged odds is that the units of the dependent 
variable have little intuitive meaning (Pampel 2000).  The odds ratios are presented in 
Table 8 and have a more intuitive interpretation.  The odds ratio is the probability of an 
event occurring (U.S. votes yes in the MDBs) divided by the probability of an event not 
occurring (U.S. votes no in the MDBs) and comparing that number to the probability of 
an event occurring.  The odds ratio for political rights is 0.706, which means that as 
respect for political rights decreases the odds of the U.S. voting yes are 0.706 to 1.  The 
odds ratio of military aid is 2.72, which means that for countries that receive military aid 
from the U.S., the odds that the U.S. will vote in their favor are 2.72 to 1.  The odds ratio 
for UN voting similarity is 0.987, which means that as voting similarity with the U.S. in 
the UN increases the odds of a U.S. yes vote are 0.987 to 1.  These are basically even 
odds indicating that UN voting similarity has virtually no effect on U.S. voting in the 
MDBs.  Finally, the odds ratio for level of development is 0.777, which means that as the 
level of development of a country increases the odds of the U.S. voting yes for that 
country are 0.777 to 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
80 
Table 3.4 Logit Estimation: Odds Ratio 
Variable Coefficient 
  
POL 0.7060571*** 
 (0.0355149) 
PI 1.046656 
 (0.0973238) 
MILAID 2.720599*** 
 (0.5082885) 
UNVOTE 0.9872949*** 
 (0.037252) 
(ln)TRADE 1.035688 
 (0.0523851) 
(ln)DEV 0.7765898** 
 (0.0707638) 
  
N 9022 
Pseudo R2 0.0757 
Wald Chi2 81.13 
  
Note: Model estimated using Logistic regression.  Robust standard errors clustered 
     around country years included in parenthesis 
     ***p≤0.001 **p≤0.01 * p≤0.05 
 
 In order to get a better sense of the impact of the independent variables on the 
odds of the U.S. voting yes on a proposal, Figure 3.2 shows the percent change in the 
odds ratio for each variable.  For respect for political rights the figure shows that for a 
one unit increase in lack of respect for political rights, the odds of a yes vote by the U.S. 
decreases by roughly 29.4 percent.  The effect of the U.S. supplying military aid to 
recipient countries has the largest effect on the likelihood the U.S. will vote in their favor 
in the MDBs.  The percent change in the odds ratio for military aid is 172 percent 
meaning the odds of a yes vote by the U.S. are 172 percent greater for those countries 
that receive U.S. military aid.  Although voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN is a 
significant predictor the direction is not in the expected direction.  The negative direction 
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indicates that as voting similarity with the U.S. increases the likelihood of a yes vote by 
the U.S. decreases.  More important is that the effect of UN voting similarity is minimal.  
As Figure 3.2 shows the actual effect of UN voting is only a -1.3 percent change in the 
odds ratio or, in other words, there is for all intents and purposes no effect of UN voting 
similarity on U.S. voting in the MDBs.  The last significant variable is level of 
development.  The more developed a country is, as measured by GDP per capita, the less 
likely it is that the U.S. will vote in favor of that country in the MDBs.  The percent 
change for level of development is that for a one-unit increase in the level of 
development the odds of a yes vote by the U.S. decrease by 22 percent    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Percent Change in Odds Ratio 
 
 Predicted Probabilities 
 Another way to interpret the results of the logit estimation model is as a type of 
predicted probabilities.  Predicted probabilities differ from log odds and odds ratio in that 
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they provide the probability of a yes vote by the U.S. at each level of the independent 
variables.  Figure 3.3 presents a scatter plot of the predicted probabilities of a U.S. yes 
vote across the observed probabilities for each level of the political rights variable.  As 
can be seen the logistic regression line slopes downward as the political rights category 
increases, and especially slopes downward towards the last two categories with a steep 
decline in the last category.  Figure 3.4 presents a scatter plot of the predicted 
probabilities of a U.S. yes vote across the observed probabilities for both levels of the 
military aid variable.  The regression line slopes significantly upward as it moves from no 
U.S. military aid to receives military aid.  Finally, Figure 3.5 presents a scatter plot of the 
predicted probabilities of a U.S. yes votes across all the observations of level of 
development.  The regression line does slope downward as the level of development 
increases but the downward trend is very small.   
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Figure 3.3 Predicted Probabilities of U.S. Yes Vote Across Political Rights
 
Figure 3.4 Predicted Probabilities of U.S. Yes Vote Across Military Aid 
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Figure 3.5 Predicted Probabilities of U.S. Vote Across Level of Development 
  
 Table 3.5 presents the predicted probabilities for each level of the political rights 
variable.  As it shows, the predicted probability of a yes vote at the first level is roughly 
92 percent, which is what would be expected since level one represents the most respect 
for political rights.  As the level of respect for political rights decreases the predicted 
probability of a U.S. yes vote decreases.  The exception here is at level five where the 
predicted probability is roughly 92 percent, whereas at level four it was at 87 percent.  
Moving to level six the predicted probability decreases strikingly to 81 percent and then 
drops even more significantly to 66 percent at level seven.   This indicates that for those 
countries which completely disregard respect for political rights the probability of 
receiving a yes vote from the U.S. is 66 percent, which is much lower than the mean for 
yes votes overall (88 percent).  The conclusion is that for those countries with the least 
respect for political rights the probability that the U.S. will vote for proposals going to 
those countries decreases dramatically.  The drop in the probability is not uniform across 
each level of the political rights variable.  From levels one through five the probability is 
roughly the same and then declines greatly for levels six and seven.   
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Table 3.5 Predicted Probabilities for Political Rights 
POL 
Predicted 
Probability 
1 0.922 
2 0.940 
3 0.911 
4 0.871 
5 0.901 
6 0.809 
7 0.658 
 
 Moving to the military aid variable, Table 3.6 shows the predicted probability of 
U.S. yes votes for both levels of the military aid variable.  When a country does not 
receive military aid from the U.S. the probability of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. is 
78 percent, but for countries that do receive U.S. military aid the probability increases to 
roughly 91 percent.  This again shows how the U.S. privileges countries in the MDBs 
who receive military aid since the mean for U.S. yes votes is 88 percent.  This is 
significantly higher than the predicted probability of 78 percent of a U.S. yes vote for 
countries that do not receive U.S. military aid.  Finally, Table 3.7 shows the predicted 
probability of a U.S. yes vote at five different levels of per capita GDP.  The five levels 
constitute two standard deviations above and below the mean (5, 1), one standard 
deviation above and below the mean (4, 2) and then also the mean (3).  The change in 
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probabilities is slight but noticeable for countries with greater per capita GDP.  At the 
lowest level of per capita GDP the probability of a country receiving a yes vote from the 
U.S. was 92 percent, but for countries at the highest level of per capita GDP the 
probability was only 80 percent.  The difference is twelve percent and it shows that the 
more developed countries seeking MDB loans tended to have a slightly below average 
chance of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. in the MDBs. 
 
Table 3.6 Predicted Probabilities for Military Aid 
MILAID 
Predicted 
Probability 
0 0.783 
1 0.908 
 
Table 3.7 Predicted Probabilities for Level of Development 
(ln)DEV 
Predicted 
Probability 
1 0.920 
2 0.897 
3 0.870 
4 0.837 
5 0.799 
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 Effect of Human Rights on Predicted Values 
 The main focus of this study is on human rights.  We have shown that the respect 
for political rights variable is highly significant, thus it is important to examine how 
influential human rights are in different contexts: when a country receives military aid, or 
whether a country has a low level of economic development, or a relatively high level of 
economic development.  Table 3.8 displays the predicted probabilities of yes votes by the 
U.S. at each level of the political rights variable and at both levels of the military aid 
variable.  What it shows is that for countries that do not receive U.S. military aid but do 
respect political rights the probability of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. is 90 percent.  
However, for those countries that do not respect political rights and also do not receive 
military aid from the U.S. the probability of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. decreases 
to 54 percent.  This is a negative change of 37 percent.  For those countries that do 
receive military aid from the U.S. and also respect political rights the probability of the 
U.S. voting in favor of policies for their country is 96 percent.  On the other hand, for 
those countries that receive U.S. military aid but do not respect political rights the 
predicted probability of a U.S. yes vote is 76 percent. This is a decrease in the probability 
by 20 percent.   
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Table 3.8. Predicted Probabilities at each level of Political Rights and Military Aid 
 
Political Rights 
No Military 
Aid Military Aid % Change (0-1) 
1 0.9028 0.9619 6% 
2 0.8677 0.9469 8% 
3 0.8224 0.9264 10% 
4 0.7657 0.8989 13% 
5 0.6977 0.8626 16% 
6 0.6197 0.8159 20% 
7 0.5350 0.7579 22% 
% Change (1-7) -37% -20%   
 
 
 This difference between a decline of 37 percent and a decline of 20 percent is 17 
percent, which shows that receiving military aid has a positive impact on the probability 
of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. even for those countries which violate political 
rights.  Figure 3.6 graphically presents the effect of change from no military aid to 
military aid on the probability of U.S. yes votes in the MDBs for each level of the 
political rights scale.  It shows that military aid has little impact on the change in 
probabilities at level one of the political rights variable because those countries already 
have a high probability of a yes vote.  The impact is seen more significantly at level 
seven where receiving military aid increases the probability of a yes vote by 22 percent. 
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Figure 3.6 Percent Change From Military Aid to No Military Aid Across All Levels 
of Political Rights 
  
 Table 3.9 presents the predicted probabilities of U.S. yes votes at different levels 
of per capita GDP and respect for political rights. The difference in the probability of 
U.S. support between countries at the lowest level of economic development that do 
respect political rights and countries also at the lowest level of economic development 
but do not respect political rights is negative 15 percent.  However, the difference in U.S. 
support between countries that are at the highest level of economic development and 
respect political rights and countries that are also at the highest level of economic 
development but do not respect political rights is negative 33 percent.  The difference of 
18 percent shows that the least economically developed countries are more likely to 
garner U.S. support in the MDBs compared to the most economically developed 
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countries even if both have the same record on political rights.  This shows that the level 
of development seems to take higher priority than human rights for the U.S. in 
determining whether to vote in favor of proposals in the MDBs.   
 
Table 3.9 Predicted Probability at each level of Political rights and Level of 
Development 
Political 
Rights 
Level of 
Dev1 (-
2 std 
Dev) 
Level of 
Dev2 (-
1 std 
Dev) 
Level 
of 
Dev3 
(mean) 
Level of 
Dev4 (1 
std Dev) 
Level of 
Dev5 (2 
std Dev) 
Difference 
(1-5) 
1 0.9736 0.9653 0.9543 0.9402 0.9220 5% 
2 0.9631 0.9515 0.9365 0.9173 0.8930 7% 
3 0.9485 0.9327 0.9124 0.8868 0.8550 9% 
4 0.9286 0.9072 0.8803 0.8469 0.8063 12% 
5 0.9018 0.8735 0.8385 0.7962 0.7461 16% 
6 0.8663 0.8298 0.7857 0.7339 0.6748 19% 
7 0.8206 0.7749 0.7214 0.6607 0.5943 23% 
Difference (1-
7) 15% 19% 23% 28% 33%   
 
 Figure 3.7 presents the changes in the likelihood of U.S. support graphically from 
the lowest level of economic development to the highest level of development for each 
level of respect for political rights.  As can be seen, at level one of political rights the 
change in level of development only has a five percent effect on the probability of U.S. 
support.  On the other hand, at level seven of political rights the change in level of 
development has a 23 percent effect on the probability of U.S. support. 
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Figure 3.7 Percent Change Across Level of Development and Political Rights 
 
 Results Without Worst Violators of Political Rights 
 Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probabilities of a U.S. yes vote across the seven 
categories of the political rights variable.  The slope declines greatly from level six to 
level seven giving an indication that it is level seven that is driving a lot of the 
significance of the variable.  Rerunning the model removing all level seven observations 
of the political rights variable (POL = 7) provides a means of examining how much of the 
significance is determined by those observations.  Table 3.10 shows the frequency for 
each level of the political rights variable.  There are only 817 observations at level seven 
out of 9,300 total which comprises only seven percent of the total observations.  
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Table 3.10 Frequencies of Political Rights 
Political Rights Frequency Percent 
1 848 9.12 
2 2,275 24.46 
3 2,012 21.63 
4 898 9.66 
5 831 8.94 
6 1,619 17.41 
7 817 8.78 
   
Total 9,300 100 
 
 
 Table 3.11 shows the descriptive statistics for the model without level seven of 
the political rights variable.  The median for the political rights variable is 3.  The mode 
for military aid is 1, while the mean for UN voting similarity is 31%.  The median for 
level of trade is $2,565.7 US millions and the median for level of development is 
$2160.55 in per capita GDP in $US.   
 
Table 3.11 Descriptive Statistics for Model Without Worst Violators of Political 
Rights 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Min Max 
POL 8483 3.406224 3 3 1.648853 1 6 
PI 8408 3.165794 3 3 0.929211 1 5 
MILAID 8563 0.8440967 1 1 0.3627848 0 1 
UNVOTE 8427 31.02453 24 0 22.51905 0 100 
TRADE 8421 16721.23 2565.7 20721.12 51573.37 0 367161.7 
DEV 8416 3134.478 2160.55 5325.82 3116.439 82.64 32926.95 
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 Table 3.12 shows that the political rights variable, level of trade variable, and 
level of development variable are all significant at the 0.001 level, while voting similarity 
in the UN variable is significant at the 0.01 level and the military aid variable is also 
significant at the 0.01 level.  As was the case in the full model, the rights of personal 
integrity variable is not significant.  The coefficient for political rights is -0.23, which 
means that for every one-unit increase in political rights disrespect the likelihood of a 
U.S. yes vote decreases by 0.23.  The coefficient for military aid is 0.59 that means that 
for countries that receive U.S. military aid the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote increases by 
0.59.  The coefficient for level of trade is 0.20, which means that for every one-unit 
increase in level of trade the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote increases by 0.20.  The 
coefficient for level of development is -0.43. That means that for every one-unit increase 
in level of development the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote decreases by 0.43.  Finally, 
although the UN vote variable is significant the coefficient is again quite small at -0.01, 
which is effect means the variable has minimal impact on the likelihood of the U.S. 
voting yes.   
 The odds ratio for the significant variables is as follows: for the political rights 
variable the odds ratio is 0.80 meaning a one-unit increase in disrespect for political 
rights lowers the odds of a U.S. yes vote to 0.8 to 1.  In terms of percent change in the 
odds ratio there is a negative 20 percent change.  This means that the chance for a U.S. 
yes vote decreases by 20 percent for a one-unit increase in disrespect for political rights.  
The odds ratio for military aid is 1.80 which means that the odds of the U.S. voting in 
favor of loans for a country that receives U.S. military aid is 1.80 to 1 for a change of 80 
percent.  The odds ratio for level of trade is 1.22 to 1 meaning a one-unit increase in level 
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of trade increases odds of a U.S. yes vote to 1.22 to 1, which is a change of 22 percent.  
The odds ratio for level of development is 0.65, which means that for a one-unit increase 
in the level of development the odds of a U.S. yes vote decrease to 0.65 to 1 or a change 
of negative 35 percent.  Finally, the odds ratio for UN voting similarity is 0.99 to 1 
meaning for a one-unit increase in the level of voting similarity between the U.S. and 
other countries increase the odds of U.S. supporting that country in the MDBs declines to 
0.99 to 1 for a change of -0.01 percent.  In actuality UN voting similarity has no effect on 
U.S. voting in the MDBs.  
 
Table 3.12 Results for Model Without Worst Violators of Political Rights 
  Log Odds Odds ratio 
Percent 
change 
POL -0.225*** 0.799*** -21.1 
 (0.050) (0.0403)  
PI -0.112 0.894 -10.6 
 (0.094) (0.0845)  
MILAID 0.586** 1.80** 80.0 
 (0.225) (0.404)  
UNVOTE -0.0101** 0.990** -0.01 
 (0.0033) (0.0033)  
(ln)TRADE 0.202*** 1.22*** 22.0 
 (0.0460) (0.0563)  
(ln)DEV -0.428*** 0.652*** -34.8 
  (0.0974) (0.0635)   
 
 
 Two interesting things stand out comparing the log odds and odds ratio of the full 
model to the model that excludes the worst violators of political rights.  First are the 
effects that level seven of the political rights variable has.  Comparing the odds ratio of 
the political rights variable in the full model (0.706) to the odds ratio in the model 
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without the level seven observations of the political rights variable (0.799) there is a 
change of 0.093, or almost 10 percent.  In effect, the worst violators of political rights 
account for almost 10 percent of the effect of the political rights variable on the 
likelihood of U.S. voting yes in the MDBs.  The conclusion one can draw from this is that 
the U.S. strongly works against the worst violators of political rights in the MDBs.  The 
other interesting conclusion from comparing the full model to the reduced model is the 
fact that level of trade is now significant in the latter.  In the full model level of trade is 
not significant and the odds ratio for the variable is 1.036 to 1 or essentially 1 to 1, which 
means that the variable has no substantive impact on the odds of the U.S. voting yes in 
the MDBs.  The level of trade variable in the reduced model is significant at the 
0.001level and the odds ratio is 1.22 to 1.  This means that a one-unit increase in level of 
trade increases the odds of U.S. support also increases by 18 percent.  
 Finally, one interesting note is that roughly half of the level seven observations of 
the political rights variable are for just one country: China.  Table 3.13 shows the 
breakdown for all level seven observations.  As can be seen China accounts for 315 of the 
809 observations or 39 percent.  An interesting possibility is that it is not necessarily the 
level seven observations that are driving so much of the significance but perhaps it can 
just be attributed to the large number of votes for China.  The next section will present 
the logit estimation without China 
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Table 3.13 Political Rights Level Seven Observations 
Year 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Belarus 0 10 4 12 8 8 42 
Central 
African 
Republic 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Chad 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 
China 43 62 60 59 44 47 315 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire 0 0 0 0 10 8 18 
Eq Guinea 1 2 0 0 4 1 8 
Eritrea 4 1 2 1 3 1 12 
Haiti 0 16 15 7 0 0 38 
Iraq 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 
Laos 7 19 15 10 15 11 77 
Myanmar 0 6 0 1 2 0 9 
S Arabia 1 2 2 1 1 1 8 
Sudan 6 2 1 1 3 3 16 
Syria 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 
Turkmenistan 3 2 1 4 2 6 18 
Uzbekistan 12 9 9 10 10 10 60 
Vietnam 17 31 21 25 28 28 150 
Zimbabwe 0 4 2 0 0 3 9 
Total 96 169 132 131 136 146 809 
 
 
 Results Without China 
 The descriptive statistics for the model without China can be found in Table 3.14.  
As with the previous models the median for the political rights variable and the physical 
integrity variables is three.  The mode for military aid is one, while the mean for UN 
voting similarity is 24 percent.  Finally, the median for level of trade is $2,457.99 in US 
millions, while the median for level of development is $2,020.58 per capita GDP.  The 
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results for the model without China are presented in Table 3.15.  As can be seen all the 
variables are significant except for the rights of personal integrity variable.  The effect of 
each variable on the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote can be discerned from the odds ratios.  
The odds ratios for the model without China are very similar to the odds ratios for the 
model absent the worst violators of political rights.  For example, the odds ratio for the 
model without China is 0.804 to 1 for a percent change in the odds ratio of -19.6 percent.  
The odds ratio for the model absent the worst violators of political rights is 0.799 to 1 for 
a percent change in the odds ratio of -21.1 percent.  What this shows is that just one 
country, China, has a significant effect on the likelihood of the U.S. voting yes for 
proposals in the MDBs.  Again, the level of trade is also significant in this model in 
contrast to the full model.  
 
Table 3.14 Descriptive Statistics for Model without China 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Min Max 
POL 8985 3.607012 3 3 1.802262 1 7 
PI 8907 3.176401 3 3 0.9168169 1 5 
MILAID 9064 0.8257944 1 1 0.3793071 0 1 
UNVOTE 8919 30.04674 24 0 22.65432 0 100 
TRADE 8883 16096.63 2457.99 20721.12 50313.16 0 367161.7 
DEV 8905 3047.021 2020.58 5325.82 3098.601 82.64 32926.95 
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Table 3.15 Results for Model Without China 
  Log Odds Odds Ratio Percent Change 
POL -.218*** .804*** -19.6 
 (.0421) (.0339)  
PI -.132 0.876 -12.4 
 (.0887) (.0776)  
MILAID 0.593** 1.81** 81.0 
 (.1864) (.3374)  
UNVOTE -.010** .990** -.01 
 (.0033) (.0033)  
(ln)TRADE 0.205*** 1.23*** 23.0 
 (.0418) (.0512)  
(ln)DEV -.440*** .644*** -35.6 
  (.0902) (.0581)   
 
 
 Summary of Results 
 In conclusion, the hypothesis that human rights influence U.S. votes in the MDBs 
receives mixed support.   Countries’ respect for political rights influences U.S. voting in 
the MDBs, but respect for the rights of personal integrity have no effect on U.S. voting in 
the MDBs.  Moving to strategic interests, whether a country receives military aid from 
the U.S. has a major impact on whether the U.S. supports loans to that country in the 
MDBs.  However, although voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN was significant, the 
coefficient was not in the hypothesized direction and the effect of the variable was not 
apparent.  The impact of economic factors on U.S. voting in the MDBs was also mixed.  
The volume of trade a country had with the U.S. was not significant in the full model and 
did not have an effect on whether the U.S. was more likely to support loans to that 
country.  However, the level of development of the recipient country was a significant 
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factor and in the hypothesized direction.  In other words, the U.S. was more likely to vote 
for loans going to countries that were on the lower end of the economic development 
spectrum than those that were on the relative high end.   
 Since human rights were the main variable under consideration in this study it is 
also important to acknowledge how human rights influenced U.S. voting behavior in 
specific strategic and economic development contexts.  Those countries that received 
U.S. military aid but had a poor political rights record were more likely to receive U.S. 
support in the MDBs by 22 percent than those countries that also had poor political rights 
record but did not receive U.S. military aid.  Also those countries that had a poor political 
rights record but where also on the lowest end of the development spectrum where more 
likely by 23 percent to garner U.S. support in the MDBs than those countries that were on 
the relatively higher end of the development spectrum and also did not respect political 
rights.  The quantitative examination of U.S. votes in the MDBs highlights the 
importance of respect for political rights, whether the country receives U.S. military aid 
or not, and whether the country is at a low level of economic development in determining 
whether the U.S. will support proposals for those countries in the MDBs.  Finally, the 
results also show that the significance of the political rights variable is largely driven by 
the worst offenders (POL =7) and in particular China.  To determine more specifically 
what factors influence U.S. voting in the MDBs the next chapter will look specifically at 
which countries the U.S. voted against in the MDBs and for what reasons. 
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CHAPTER 4: REASON CODE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 The previous chapter presented the results from the logit estimation of U.S. votes 
in the MDBs.  The results showed that a country’s support for political rights was a 
significant determinant of whether the U.S. would vote in favor of proposals for that 
country.  Of particular importance was that the likelihood of a U.S. yes votes was greatly 
impacted by whether the country was one of the worst violators of political rights.  
Whether a country received military aid from the U.S. was also a significant predictor of 
a U.S. yes vote.  Finally, a country’s level of development was a significant predictor of 
U.S. voting to approve proposals in the MDBs.  The previous chapter’s examination of 
voting data highlights important trends on how human rights and other factors influence 
U.S. voting in the MDBs, but it lacks specifics regarding variation in U.S. voting 
behavior across countries and specific human rights issues.  This chapter addresses those 
concerns by examining the reason codes published by the Treasury Department along 
with the voting data. The reason codes are references to specific legislation, which 
requires the U.S. Executive Director (USED) to vote no on proposals for specific reasons.  
There are 64 reason codes (See Appendix) 22 of which deal with human rights.   
 The rest of this chapter lays out the evidence from the analysis of the reason 
codes.  It begins with a section on the U.S. MDB policymaking process (i.e. the voting 
decision process).  The next two sections break the human rights reason codes down into 
three categories: general human rights code, specific human rights codes, and country 
specific codes, and describes what the legislation referenced by the codes mandates the 
USED to do.  The next section addresses in total how many human rights codes have 
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been applied. The following section includes the human rights reason codes broken down 
by year and specific code.  The next three sections present the number of general human 
rights codes, specific human rights codes, and country specific codes applied, 
respectively.  This is followed by a section that identifies which countries have had the 
most codes applied to them and which codes in particular.  The final section looks at the 
reason codes applied to China and also includes a description of overall U.S. policy 
towards China in the MDBs since the 1980s. 
   
U.S. MDB Policy Making Process  
The U.S. exerts a considerable amount of influence in the MDBs through both 
formal and informal means.  Several studies have shown that the U.S. has been 
particularly successful in affecting MDB activities through informal channels involving 
staffing decisions and choice of leadership (Babb 2009; Andersen et al 2006; Woods 
2003; Wade 2002).  This section will focus exclusively on the influence exerted through 
formal means, particularly through the voting structure of the MDBs 
The U.S. is represented in the MDBs in both the Board of Governors and the 
Board of Directors.  The front line in the relationship between the U.S. and the MDBs, 
however, is in the Board of Directors.  The U.S. Executive Director represents the 
interests of the U.S. in the Board of Directors (the Treasury Secretary represents the U.S. 
in the Board of Governors) and is responsible for casting votes on behalf of the U.S. The 
USEDs have been described as the “eyes, ears, and voices of the United States within 
those organizations [MDBs].” (Sanford 2001b)  The President appoints the USEDs and 
they report, through the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, to the Treasury 
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Department. The Treasury Department has been delegated responsibility over U.S. 
participation in the MDBs.  The day-to-day management issues are handled by the Office 
of Multilateral Development Banking, which consists of a small staff of roughly 20 
individuals and led by a director who reports to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Development Finance and Debt (Upton 2000).  In recent years, however, 
the staffing level has dropped to only five full time and five part time people involved 
with MDB issues in the Treasury Department (Treasury Department Interview 2011).   
Although the Treasury Department has the lead in MDB operations, it is not the 
only Executive Branch agency with influence over MDB policy.  The Treasury 
Department leads a weekly inter-agency meeting called the Working Group on 
Multilateral Assistance (WGMA) in which other government agencies can weigh in on 
MDB policy.  The WGMA reviews the loan packages on which the USED will have to 
vote to determine if the loans are consistent with U.S. policy and U.S. law.  The WGMA 
then sends its recommendations on to the Treasury, which in turn sends them to the 
USEDs.  Participants in the WGMA include officials from the Treasury, State, 
Agriculture and Commerce Departments as well as representatives from USAID, Federal 
Reserve, and Export-Import Bank (Sanford 2001b).   
The State Department, and specifically the Office of Development Finance, 
reviews MDB loan proposals to determine if they are in line with current U.S. human 
rights policy and law (State Department Interview 2011).  In addition to the weekly 
WGMA there is also a monthly meeting with staff from the Treasury and State 
Departments, USAID and various NGOs.  The Bank Information Center (BIC) a 
watchdog group that monitors the projects and policies of the World Bank and other 
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international financial institutions organizes the meeting.  The agenda of the meetings is 
set by the BIC and other NGOs represented but the focus is often on the environmental 
and humanitarian issues associated with MDB lending.  This monthly meeting allows 
NGOs some space to voice their concerns regarding MDB policy and lending decisions 
to those responsible for formulating U.S. MDB voting decisions (State Department 
Interview 2011).   
Congress also plays a role in formulating U.S. policy in the MDBs. In general, 
Congress sets the broad outlines for U.S. policy while the Executive (primarily the 
Treasury) has responsibility for managing the details of that policy (Sanford 1982). There 
are two basic ways for Congress to set MDB policy: through the use of substantive 
legislation which attempts to control the “voice and vote” of the U.S. in the MDBs, and; 
appropriations legislation that uses the “power of the purse” to set the U.S. contribution 
limits to the MDBs (Sanford 1988). Decisions made regarding MDB contributions are 
situated within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House 
Financial Services Committee.  The use of substantive legislation creates obligations for 
the USEDs to vote against certain loan packages or loans to certain countries, or at 
minimum express reservations regarding the proposal or the county that is receiving it. 
Congress has used both substantive and appropriations legislation to address human 
rights issues over fifteen times since the passage of the IFI Act in 1977.   
One of the major limitations on the ability of Congress to use legislation, 
especially substantive legislation, to impact U.S. policy toward the MDBs is oversight of 
the implementation of that legislation. There is an inherent tension between the Executive 
Branch and Congress in the implementation of foreign policy and multilateral aid policy 
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is no exception.  For example, section 701 of the IFI act mandating that the U.S. use its 
“voice and vote” to steer loans away from states that violate human rights was a point of 
contention between the Carter administration and Congress as well as the Reagan 
administration and Congress (Forsythe 1987).  Legislation passed by Congress is 
implemented by the Executive Branch agencies, and with the case of the MDBs by the 
Treasury Department.  Congress is at an information disadvantage in relation to the 
Executive, and the MDBs themselves, since the USED reports directly to the Treasury 
department.  To rectify some of this information asymmetry Congress has required the 
Treasury department to report periodically with specific information on MDB activities 
and U.S. votes.  
 
Human Rights Legislation 
 General and Specific Human Rights Reason Codes 
The human rights category is comprised of 22 reason codes that derive from 15 
pieces of legislation (see Table 4.1).  The human rights reason codes can be broken down 
into three categories.  The first is called the general human rights category and contains 
only one code.  This category includes only the general human rights provision of Sec. 
701 of the 1977 International Financial Institutions Act.  This section requires the USEDs 
to vote against proposals going to countries that systematically violate the human rights 
of their citizens. More specifically, the general human rights provision of the IFI act 
states that the US is to vote against loans going to countries that engage in “torture or 
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without 
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charges, or other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person” (IFI Act 1977, 
Sec 701).     
Table 4.1 Human Rights Legislation 
Public Law Description 
P.L. 95-118, Sec 701 Human Rights – use voice and vote to steer loans away from 
countries that consistently engage in “torture or cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged 
detention without charges, or other flagrant denial to life, 
liberty, and the security of person.” Unless the assistance 
contributes to basic human needs. 
P.L. 107-115, Sec. 581 
(b-d) 
Harboring indictees for war crimes 
P.L. 104-208, 570(a)(2) Policy Towards Burma (human rights/democratic 
government) 
P.L. 108-447, Sec. 
554(a) 
Government of Cambodia – assistance supports basic human 
needs, assistance does not support basic human needs 
P.L. 109-102, Sec. 
561(a)(1) 
Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees – exceptions or 
waiver authority not applied, exceptions or waiver authority 
applies 
P.L. 100-202, Sec. 
406(1) 
Worker Rights 
P.L. 104-208, Sec. 579 Female Genital Mutilation 
P.L. 105-292, Title V, 
Sec. 402, 405(12) and 
422 
Religious Persecution – assistance supports basic human 
needs, assistance does not support basic human needs 
P.L. 106-386, Sec 110 Trafficking in Persons, assistance supports one or more 
specified exceptions, assistance does not qualify under any 
specified exception 
P.L. 107-99 Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 
P.L. 109-102 Zimbabwe 
P.L. 109-102, Sec 563 Serbia – certified, not certified 
P.L. 107-245 Sudan Peace Act section 6(b)(2) (2002). 
P.L. 108-61 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
P.L. 111-117 Sri Lanka – assistance supports basic human needs, 
assistance does not support basic human needs 
 
The second category is specific human rights violations and contains nine codes.  
This category includes legislation that requires the USED to use its “voice and vote” to 
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steer MDB proposals away from countries that violate specific human rights.  The 
specific rights in question include failure to apprehend war criminals, violating worker’s 
rights, female gentile mutilation, religious persecution, and allowing human trafficking.  
With regard to apprehending war criminals there are two pieces of legislation in question: 
the Foreign Appropriations Act of 2002 specifically section 581 (b-d) and the Foreign 
Appropriations Act of 2006 specifically sections 561(a)(1), which deal with the harboring 
of war criminals and the failure to apprehend war criminals respectively.  These pieces of 
legislation came about in the aftermath of the wars in the Balkans.  The U.S. Congress 
felt that countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia were dragging 
their feet in cooperating with the ICTY and inactively searching for war criminals that 
may have been living within their borders.  Both pieces of legislation require the 
Secretary of State to make the determination as to whether these countries have taken the 
necessary steps to meet their international obligations regarding apprehending war 
criminals and cooperation with the ICTY.  In addition, the Secretary of State can waive 
the prohibition if the assistance is humanitarian, supports democratization, or if it directly 
supports the implementation of the Dayton Accords.   
Another specific type of human right represented with a reason code is the rights 
of workers.  The Foreign Appropriations Act of 1988, specifically section 406 (1) 
required the USED to vote against loans to countries which violate worker’s rights by 
denying their ability to form independent labor unions. 
The legislative prohibition on female genital mutilation stems from the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, specifically section 579, which has two 
components.  The USED is to use its “voice and vote” to oppose any loan going to 
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countries where (1) female genital mutilation is common practice and the country (2) has 
not taken steps to implement educational programs to help prevent the practice of female 
genital mutilation.  The prohibition does not prevent the USED from voting for loans 
going to countries where female genital mutilation occurs.  It only requires that the 
USED vote to prevent loans going to those countries where the practice occurs and they 
are not actively trying to reduce it through educational programs. 
An additional specific human rights legislative prohibition includes repression of 
religious freedom.  In 1998 Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act 
(IRFA), which was intended to make support for religious freedom a core component of 
U.S. foreign policy.  The IRFA established various entities required to monitor religious 
freedom around the world including the Office of International Religious Freedom.  This 
office is charged with designating specific countries as a Country of Particular Concern 
(CPC) if they commit “systematic, ongoing and egregious violations of religious 
freedom.” (IRFA 1998)  The IRFA gives the President a number of tools to deal with 
countries that are deemed to be of particular concern for their denial of religious freedom.  
Those tools include public condemnation, denial of public visits, and more consequential 
tools such as withdrawal of financial assistance.  This of course includes the ability to 
direct the USED to use its voice and vote to steer funds away from those countries that 
severely violate religious freedom.  The IRFA was later amended to allow the President 
to waive punishment for religious freedom violators if it was believed that doing so was 
necessary for national security or in the interest of religious freedom.  
The final specific human rights legislative prohibition is human trafficking.  The 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), passed in 2000, mandates 
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that the U.S. will not provide assistance to countries that fail to comply with minimum 
standards for the elimination of human trafficking or, at a minimum, are not working 
towards such ends.  The exception to the prohibition includes assistance for humanitarian 
or trade related issues (VTVPA 2000).  The mechanics of the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act are similar to the International Religious Freedom Act.  The 
VTVPA requires the State Department to annually a list of countries that are failing to 
meet the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking and are also failing at 
working towards compiling with the minimum standards.  The President is then required 
to direct the USED to use its voice and vote to steer funds away from those countries that 
violate the act.  However, much like the IRFA, there are certain conditions under which 
the President can exercise some waiver authority in implementing the provisions of the 
VTVPA.  For instance, the President can waive the prohibition if the assistance to the 
country is deemed to be in the U.S. national interest or if the country is already subject to 
other human rights prohibitions, thereby making the current prohibition redundant. 
 
 Country Specific Human Rights Reason Codes 
The third human rights reason code category is country specific legislation.  This 
category includes legislation requiring the USEDs to vote against loans going to Burma, 
Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Serbia, Sudan, and, as of 2009, Sri Lanka.  The reason for the 
legislation varies depending on the country and includes general issues such as promoting 
democratic reforms, as well as specific measures such as apprehending war criminals.  
There are two separate pieces of legislation governing U.S. policy toward Burma in the 
MDBs, the 1997 Consolidated Appropriations Act specifically sec 570(a)(2), and the 
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Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA) of 2003.  The first piece of legislation 
prevents votes for proposals going to Burma until it makes progress on implementing 
democratic reforms and improving human rights practices. The legislation requires that 
the USED continue to vote against proposals for Burma until the President certifies to 
Congress that the Burmese government has successfully moved forward in implementing 
democratic reforms.  The President can also waive the prohibition if the assistance will 
contribute to U.S. national security.  Finally, the statute also allows for waiver of the 
prohibition if the assistance is for humanitarian needs, counter-narcotic assistance, crop 
substitution assistance, or promotes human rights or democracy in Burma (Consolidated 
Appropriations Act 1997, Sec 570(a)(2)).   
The second piece of legislation, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
(BFDA), specifically acknowledges that the U.S. will recognize the National League of 
Democracy (NLD) as the legitimate representative of the Burmese people and not the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the current ruling junta of Burma.  Also, 
the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act lays out specific measures the Burmese 
government must take before the U.S. will support loans to Burma in the MDBs.  
Specifically they include measureable progress on reducing the incidents of rape, 
violations of workers rights including using forced and child labor, releasing all political 
prisoners, allowing freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of association, freedom 
of religion, and transition to civilian government through democratic elections (BFDA 
2003).  
Another country specific legislative prohibition is found in the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) of 2001.  The Act requires the USED 
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to vote against proposals going to Zimbabwe until the President certifies that the rule of 
law has been restored in Zimbabwe including, “respect for ownership and title to 
property, freedom of speech and association, and an end to the lawlessness, violence, and 
intimidation sponsored, condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the 
ruling party, and their supporters or entities” (ZDERA 2001).  The legislation also calls 
on Zimbabwe to conduct free and fair Presidential elections along with other reforms 
regarding the distribution of land, ending its involvement in the war in the Congo, and 
bringing the military under civilian control.  
In addition, there are legislative prohibitions preventing the USED from voting 
for proposals going to Cambodia.   The prohibition was amended in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act in 2005, specifically section 554(a), to allow for approval only of 
funds that would go to local governments in Cambodia, or NGOs working in Cambodia, 
but not to the central government.  The legislation has a basic human needs exemption 
and also provides for exemptions for education and basic healthcare programs, rule of 
law programs, counter-narcotics programs, and programs that aim to combat human 
trafficking (Consolidated Appropriations Act 2005, Sec 554(a)).  The intentions of the 
legislative prohibitions are multipurpose but are mainly intended to put pressure on the 
Cambodian government to cooperate with the hybrid tribunal prosecuting individuals for 
crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge era.  The legislation requires that the 
Secretary of State provide assurances that the Cambodian judicial system is adequate in 
terms of independence and adherence to international standards of justice and fairness 
(Lum 2007). 
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There are also legislative prohibitions against voting for proposals involving the 
government of Serbia. Section 563 of the Foreign Appropriations Act of 2006 requires 
that before the USED can support loans to Serbia the President must certify that Serbia is 
cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The 
certification takes place each year after May 31st. Cooperation entails access for 
investigators, the provision of documents, and the surrender of those under indictment or, 
at minimum, help in providing their apprehension.  The legislation specifically mentions 
that both Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic must be apprehended.4  The legislation 
also says that before the President can certify Serbia the government must no longer be 
providing support to Bosnian Serb institutions and must have begun implementation of 
laws meant to protect ethnic minorities (Foreign Appropriations Act 2006, Sec 563).  
Loans going for humanitarian needs or pro-democracy aid are not subject to the 
prohibition.   
The prohibition preventing the USED from voting for proposals going to the 
Sudan stemmed from the ongoing human rights abuses committed by the Sudanese 
government.  The Sudan Peace Act was passed in 2001 and contained a variety of 
provisions for the U.S. government to undertake to pressure the Sudanese government to 
stem the atrocities it was committing, including genocide and slavery.  The legislative 
language directing the USED to oppose loans to Sudan in the Sudan Peace Act is slightly 
different than the other pieces of legislation.  The normal language used is for the USEDs 
to use their “voice and vote” to deny loans to specific countries.  The Sudan Peace Act 
however uses arguably stronger language.  It states that the USED is to “continue to vote 
                                                        
4 Both were eventually arrested, Ratko Mladic in 2011 and Radovan Karadzic in 2008 
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against and actively oppose any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, 
or guarantee to the Government of Sudan.” (Sudan Peace Act 2001, Sec. 6(b)(2))  The 
difference is in the use of the language of “voice and vote” in the other legislation vs. the 
“vote against and actively oppose” language of the Sudan Peace Act, the latter is 
arguably stronger and more forceful than the former.  The Sudan Peace Act also requires 
the Treasury Secretary to issue semi-annual reports to the requisite Congressional 
committees on the steps taken by the USED in opposing a loan, credit, or guarantee to 
Sudan.  Humanitarian assistance is exempt from the prohibition as is aid going to areas 
beyond the control of the Sudanese central government.   
 Finally, in the case of Sri Lanka the prohibition stems from the treatment of 
refugees and internally displaced people following the government’s final defeat of the 
Tamil tigers in 2009.  The 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, specifically section 
7089, states that the USED must vote against any loan, agreement, or other form of 
financial assistance to the Sri Lankan government unless the Secretary of State affirms 
that the government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to account for the atrocities committed 
in putting down the Tamil Tigers.  Specifically, the Secretary of State must certify that 
the government of Sri Lanka is taking steps to bring to justice members of the military 
who have allegedly violated international humanitarian and human rights law; that the 
government is respecting international human rights law including rights of due process, 
freedom of the press and assembly; that it is treating internally displaced people in 
accordance with international standing by guaranteeing their freedom of movement, 
providing access to humanitarian organizations, and accounting for persons detained in 
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the conflict; and finally, that the government is promoting policies that are aimed at 
reconciliation and justice (Consolidated Appropriations Act 2010, Sec. 7089 (4)(e)). 
 
Reason Code Description 
 Overall Use of Reason Codes 
 
Over the period from 2004 – 2009 the U.S. assigned 534 votes a human rights 
reason code. By way of comparison, 224 votes were assigned a transparency reason code, 
237 were assigned an environmental reason code, and 607 proposals were assigned an 
economic code (see Figure 4.1).  These constitute just over five, two, two, and six percent 
of the total U.S. votes in the MDBs respectively (see Figure 4.2).  Overall votes with 
reason codes constitute about 16 percent of the total U.S. votes (see Figure 4.3).  As was 
mentioned in chapter three, only thirteen percent of U.S. votes were no or abstain votes 
(1,313 out of 9,766 total votes, see Figure 4.4).  U.S. law requires the Treasury 
Department and the USED to provide a reason for why they vote no or abstain from 
voting.  Hence the reason codes provide the official reason why the U.S. is voting no or 
abstaining.  The Treasury and USED are not required to provide a reason for why they 
vote yes; so for the most part the number of reason codes should correlate with the 
number of no/abstain votes.  The discrepancy between the 13 percent of no/abstain votes 
and the 16 percent of total votes with reason codes can be accounted for by the basic 
human needs exemption or what is otherwise known as the “needy people clause” 
(Apodaca 2005).     
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Figure 4.1 Frequencies of Reason Codes 
 
Figure 4.2 Reason Code as Percentage of Total Votes 
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Figure 4.3 Percentages of Votes with Reason Codes 
 
Figure 4.4 Percentages of Yes and No Votes 
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The purpose of the basic human needs exemption is to allow aid to go to countries 
if it directly benefits needy people.  A foreign aid official once described the purpose of 
the basic human needs exemption as, “Why should the poor be twice penalized  . . .once 
by their government torturing and repressing them, and then by the U.S. by depriving 
them economic aid?” (quoted in Apodaca 2005: 67).  Of the 15 pieces of legislation that 
require the USED to vote no on projects to countries that violate human rights, seven 
include basic human needs exemptions.  Of those 534 votes assigned a human rights 
code, 133 were basic human needs exceptions.  Therefore 401 votes were either no votes 
or abstentions for human rights reasons (See Figure 4.5).    
 
 
Figure 4.5 Basic Human Needs Codes 
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 Human Rights Reason Codes by Year and Code 
Table 4.2 shows the human rights reason codes broken down by year and specific 
reason code.  From 2004 to 2009 the use of human rights reason codes has varied 
considerably, peaking in 2005 with 124 codes and declining steadily to only 55 codes in 
2009.  In 2004 the number of human rights codes used was 90 and in 2006 and 2007 the 
number was 96.  2007 and 2008 represent a significant decline in the use of human rights 
codes with 73 and 55 codes used, respectively. The first year of the Obama 
administration saw a large decrease in the use of human rights reason codes from the 
previous years under the Bush administration.    The year-to-year variation in human 
rights codes has many potential explanations.   One explanation could be that the total 
number of votes per year have gone down so correspondingly the number of human 
rights codes applied has gone down as well.  As seen in Figure 4.6, this is not the case.  
The total number of votes per year has varied between almost 1,400 votes in 2004 to a 
high of 1,742 in 2007 and back down to 1,669 in 2009.  The point however, is that as the 
number of human rights codes declined significantly in 2008 and 2009 the number of 
total votes in the MDBs was roughly equal to the previous years, excluding 2004.   
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Figure 4.6 Numbers of Votes per Year 
The decline in the number of human rights codes as compared to the number of 
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of country that was seeking loans from the MDBs those years generally had a better 
human rights record? To examine the second point it is necessary to get a picture of the 
overall human rights record of recipient countries for each year.   
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Figure 4.7 Percentages of Votes with Human Rights Reason Code per Year 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the average political rights (POL) score for each year under 
study.  There is some variation in the average score across the years.  The scale ranges 
from 1-7 with 7 indicating extreme repression on political rights.  The range of scores 
goes from a high of 4.1 in 2005 to a low of 3.7 in 2007.  The average scores from 2004, 
2008, and 2009 are 3.9, 3.8, and 3.9 respectively.  Figure 4.9 shows the average personal 
integrity rights (PI) score for each year under study.  In contrast to the political rights 
scores there is almost no variation in the physical integrity score across the years.  The 
rights of personal integrity scores range from 1-5 with 5 indicating extreme repression on 
physical integrity rights.  The average score for each year is 3.2, except 2008 with an 
average score of 3.1.  A positive increase in the human rights record of countries seeking 
loans in the MDBs does not seem to be the cause of the decline in the number of human 
rights codes in 2008 and 2009. As a crude correlation the variation in average political 
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rights scores does not really track the decline in human rights codes in 2008 and 2009, 
but on the other hand does track the increase in codes use in 2004.  The decrease in 
human rights codes in 2008 and 2009 also does not track with the average rights of 
personal integrity score since the average score is essentially unchanged.  
 
Figure 4.8 Mean Political Rights Score per Year
 
Figure 4.9 Mean Personal Integrity Rights Score per Year 
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 General Human Rights Code 
Examining the three areas of human rights codes (general human rights provision, 
specific human rights violations, and country specific legislation) one can see that the 
general human rights provision has been utilized the most.  As Table 4.2 shows, the 
general human rights code was used 297 times over the six years, which accounts for 
roughly 56 percent of the human rights codes applied. 107 of the general human rights 
codes were human needs exemptions where the USED actually voted for the proposal 
since it helped support basic human needs.  If the proposal was for a project that did not 
support basic human needs the USED would have voted no based on the human rights 
record of the recipient country. Figure 4.10 shows general human rights codes (including 
the basic human needs exemption) as a percentage of all human rights codes used each 
year.  As a percentage of all human rights codes, the general human rights code increased 
every year from a low of 44 percent in 2004 to a high of 72 percent in 2009, with a one 
year dip in between from 59 percent in 2006 to 57 percent in 2007.
 
Figure 4.10 General Human Rights Code as Percentage of All Human Rights Codes 
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One interesting trend regarding the use of the general human rights code is the 
increase in the use of the basic human needs exemption over the six years corresponding 
with a decrease in use of the general human rights code.  In 2004 the human needs 
exemption of the general human rights code was only applied six times but it 
subsequently increased every year, reaching 28 applications in 2009.  Correspondingly, 
the application of the general human rights code parallels the application of human rights 
codes overall across the six years.  It reached the highpoint in 2005 when it was applied 
48 times and then decreased in 2008 and 2009 when it was used 21 times and 12 times, 
respectively.  As a percentage of the general human rights code basic human needs 
exemptions have increased every year.  As Figure 4.11 shows, the human needs 
exemption has increased from 15 percent of general human rights codes in 2004 to 70 
percent of general human rights codes in 2009 with a steady increase every year. 
  
Figure 4.11 Basic Human Needs Exemption as Percentage of General Human Rights 
Code 
 
0 10 
20 30 
40 50 
60 70 
80 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Basic Human Needs Exemption 
  
123 
 Specific Human Rights Violations Codes and Country Specific Human Rights 
 Codes 
Table 4.2 also presents the number of times the specific human rights violations 
codes were applied as well as the number of times the country specific human rights 
codes were applied.  The failure to apprehend war criminals code was the most frequently 
applied specific human rights violation code.  It was applied 141 times over the past six 
years and, additionally, the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption was applied 14 
times.   The trafficking in persons code was the second most applied specific human 
rights violation code but it was only applied 21 times. The trafficking in persons 
exemption was also applied three times.  The only other specific human rights violations 
reason codes applied were religious prosecution (five times), religious prosecution human 
needs exemption (once), and violating worker rights (once).    
 As was mentioned above, the failure to apprehend war criminals legislation 
specifically instructs the USED to vote against loans that go to countries that have not 
taken steps to apprehend suspected war criminals and transfer them to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITCY).  The legislation also states that the 
determination of whether or not a country has taken adequate steps to bring suspected 
war criminals to the ITCY is to be determined by the Secretary of State (Foreign 
Appropriations Act 2006, Section 563).    Looking at the use of the apprehending war 
criminals code one can see a similar pattern in its application of the general human rights 
code.  Figure 4.12 shows the use of failure to apprehend war criminals code (including 
the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption) as a percentage of total human rights 
codes per year.  As a percentage of the human rights codes used each year the failure to 
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apprehend war criminals code (including the exemption) has increased each year from 24 
percent in 2004 to 29 and 32 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively and then to a high of 
41 percent in 2007.  The percentage then begins to decline to 30 percent in 2008 and 
precipitously declines to only four percent in 2009 with the code only applied twice in 
that year.   
 
 
Figure 4.12 Failure to Apprehend War Criminals as Percentage of All Human 
Rights Codes 
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human needs exemption; the code for Cambodia was used 14 times over six years with 
all 14 of them used in 2004 and 2005.  Following those two the next most frequently 
applied codes were the two codes which reference Burma (six times for each), the code 
for Sudan (applied 8 times), and the code for Sri Lanka (once) and Sri Lanka human 
needs exemption (three times) 
Table 4.2 Use of Human Rights Reason Codes (By specific code and year) 
Total 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
General Human Rights 
(7) General HR (Human 
Needs) 6 12 16 21 24 28 107 
(8) General HR 34 48 41 34 21 12 190 
Specific Human Rights Violations 
(12) War Crimes (Harboring) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(20) War Crimes (failure to 
apprehend) 17 36 29 35 22 2 141 
(43) War Crimes (Failure to 
Apprehend-Exemption) 5 0 2 4 0 3 14 
(21) Worker Rights 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
(22) FGM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(28) Religious Persecution 
(Human Needs) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
(29) Religious Persecution 4 1 0 0 0 0 5 
(40) Trafficking (Exemption) 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
(41) Trafficking 6 7 5 0 0 3 21 
Specific Country Legislation 
(13) Policy Towards Burma 
(Human Rights/Democratic 
Governance) 0 4 1 0 1 0 6 
(14) Cambodia 5 4 0 0 0 0 9 
(15) Cambodia (Human 
Needs) 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
(45) Zimbabwe (Democracy 
and Econ Recovery Act) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(46) Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(47) Serbia 11 1 1 0 0 0 13 
(48) Serbia (certified) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(52) Sudan  1 0 0 1 3 3 8 
(53) Burma (freedom and dem 
act) 0 4 1 0 1 0 6 
(63) Sri Lanka (Human Needs) 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
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(64) Sri Lanka  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 90 124 96 96 73 55 534 
 
 
 Human Rights Codes by Country  
 The human rights codes broken down by country and specific codes are listed in 
the appendix.  Overall there are 23 countries (including a regional category which 
includes loan proposals that cover more than one country) that have had human rights 
reason codes applied to their loan proposal; just over 50 percent of these codes applied to 
one country: China.  171 of these are the general human rights code, while 102 are in the 
general human needs exemption category.  The last two codes applied to China are in 
reference to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act.  The reason this was applied to 
China is because the proposed loan under consideration involved both China and Burma, 
so the code applies to both countries.  Therefore, the total number of human rights codes 
applied to China from 2004 to 2009 was 275.  Unfortunately, with the general human 
rights provision the Treasury Department is not required to identify precisely why the 
code was applied (e.g. torture, degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention, 
etc).   
 In addition to China, the other countries to which at least one general human 
rights code was applied (including the general human needs exemption) include: Burundi, 
Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Regional, and Sudan.  For most of 
these countries the code was only applied a few times.  The second most general human 
rights codes applied to one country is Sudan with seven codes, two of which were basic 
human needs exemptions, applied over six years.  Figure 4.13 shows what percentage of 
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the general human rights codes usage each country accounted for from 2004-2009.  As 
can be seen, China accounts for over 90 percent of the general human rights codes 
applied over the six-year period with the other countries only receiving negligible 
amounts. 
 
Figure 4.13 Percentage of General Human Rights Codes per Country 
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codes applied by the U.S.  The country with the third most codes is Bosnia with 34, all of 
which deal with the failure to apprehend war criminals (with six exemptions) and also 
one code for Serbia, which stems from a project in which both Serbia and Bosnia were 
involved: hence the Serbia code applied to the vote.  Sudan has the fourth most code 
applications, which are spread out across various issues.  Seven of the codes reference the 
general human rights provision (two general human needs exemptions).  One was for 
failing to secure the rights of workers and another six were for religious persecution (with 
one human needs exemption); four were for human trafficking (with one human needs 
exemptions), and seven codes referenced the Sudan Peace Act.  Sudan is unique among 
the countries listed in that multiple codes were applied rather than just the general human 
needs code.   
 The total number of votes for each country for each year is listed in the appendix.  
As can be seen this measure varies widely.  For example, the country with the most votes 
and hence the most proposals in the MDBs is Russia with 505.  On the other side of the 
spectrum are places like Bahrain, the Canary Islands, and Dubai with only one vote each 
over the entire period.  Knowing the total number of votes for each country helps put the 
application of human rights codes to any one country into better prospective.  Figure 4.14 
displays the number of human rights codes each country received as a percentage of their 
overall votes in the MDBs.  When looking at the prevalence of human rights codes as 
percentage of votes for each country some interesting things stand out.  For example, 
China and Serbia have a high percentage of their overall votes assigned human rights 
codes, 87 and 72 percent respectively.  Perhaps more interesting are those countries that 
did not have a lot of human rights codes applied overall, but as a percentage of the overall 
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votes for the country they were quite high.  Examples of these countries include Bosnia 
with 42 percent of its proposals having a human rights code, Iran with 50 percent, and 
Venezuela with 47 percent.  As far as total votes are concerned Bosnia had a total of 82 
while Iran had a total of eight and Venezuela had a total of 19 (see appendix).  Also of 
note is the fact that for Burma and Sudan human rights codes represents 140 and 156 
percent of their total votes respectively.  The reason the number of human rights codes 
exceeds the total number of votes is that multiple codes can be used as a reason for voting 
against the proposal.  Both Burma and the Sudan had relatively few votes overall with 
only ten and 16, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.14 Human Rights Codes as Percentage of All Votes 
  
0.0 20.0 
40.0 60.0 
80.0 100.0 
120.0 140.0 
160.0 180.0 
Bosnia
 
Bulgar
ia  Burund
i 
Cambo
dia  China  Croatia
 
Equato
rial Gu
inea  Iran 
Kazhak
stan  Kenya  Lebano
n  Libya  Moldov
a 
Myanm
ar 
Region
al 
Roman
ia  Russia  Serbia  Sri Lan
ka  Sudan  Uganda
 
Venezu
ela 
Zimbab
we 
Human Rights Codes as Percentage of All 
Votes 
  
130 
 Two things stand out when looking at the use of the human rights codes are the 
number of general human rights codes applied to China, and the number of times the 
failure to apprehend war criminals codes were used.  There were 273 general human 
rights codes applied to China, which represents 87 percent of their total votes. This puts 
China far ahead as the country with the most human rights codes applied. The main 
reason so many general human rights codes were applied to China is because China had 
so many proposals going up for votes in the MDBs.  China had the fourth most proposals 
voted on by the U.S. with 315 (see appendix).   
 The focus on the apprehension of war criminals reflects the U.S. role in trying to 
end the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s.  The use of the codes is spread across multiple 
countries but is mostly focused on Serbia and to a lesser extent Bosnia.  Since China 
looms large in the discussion of human rights and U.S. voting in the MDBs it is necessary 
to examine that relationship in more detail to determine why the U.S. has made it a 
priority to consistently vote against proposals for China in the MDBs. 
 
U.S. Foreign Policy and China in the MDBs 
 Overview of U.S. Foreign Policy towards China 
 In general terms the U.S. relationship with China has been very complex.  On the 
one hand, both countries view one another as strategic rivals; but on the other hand both 
countries are deeply intertwined economically with each other.  Regarding issues of 
human rights, climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and other issues requiring global 
cooperation, China and the U.S. are often in opposition to one another.  Much has been 
written recently about the possible transition from American hegemony to Chinese 
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hegemony and the potential for great power conflict between the two countries (Friedberg 
2005; Christensen 2006; Friedberg 2011).  In that sense it is useful to view the 
relationship between the U.S. and China in the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank as one manifestation of the larger competition between the two countries.  
Throughout history the relationship between hegemonic states and rising powers have 
typically been uneasy and the relationship between China and the U.S. is no exception.  
The relationship between the dominant power and the rising challenger is one of 
competition that can manifest itself in various ways.  Traditionally, competition was 
centered on military and economic factors, which also characterize the current U.S. China 
relationship, but there are more contemporary factors that also characterize their 
competitive relationship, including human rights.    
 The U.S. has been very critical of China’s human rights record for decades.  
China is important for the overall functioning of the global human rights regime because 
of its economic, military, and demographic size (Foot 2000).  China’s record on human 
rights is also concerning for those who feel that the global human rights regime needs a 
strong state to underlie its operation since the possibility of China displacing the U.S. as 
the world’s most powerful country is a distinct possibility.  This is problematic since 
China has strongly adhered to traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty, which are 
often anathema to the idea of universal human rights. The Chinese government 
responding to international condemnation of its human rights records has often argued 
that such criticism violates the norm of state sovereignty.   
 Despite the resistance of the Chinese government to human rights pressure it has 
signed numerous international human rights treaties including the Convention Against 
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Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the International Convention of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) among others.  In addition, China has 
also added changes to domestic law that include respect for human rights, most 
importantly to its constitution.  Some of the domestic laws for example, have to do with 
regulations of the police and judicial system, reform of labor laws, rights to education, 
and rights of ethnic minorities among others (Wan 2007).  A rising middle class and 
increased prominence at the international level are posited as explanations for the 
Chinese government’s (at least superficial) legal embrace of some human rights treaties 
and laws (Wan 2007).  Regardless of these measures towards human rights that China has 
made the U.S. continues to challenge China on its human rights record.  This occurs not 
only in voting against proposals for China in the MDBs but in a host of additional 
economic sanctions as well (Rennack 2005).   
 
 Votes in the MDBs 
 As was seen above, votes for China in the MDBs received the most human rights 
codes by the U.S. Just over 50 percent of the human rights codes applied were directed at 
China.  This number is reflective of the large volume of loans the Chinese bring forward 
in the MDBs, but it also indicates that the U.S. is not squeamish about airing its 
displeasure with the Chinese human rights record in a multilateral setting.    Overall there 
were 275 human rights codes applied to votes for China from 2004-2009: 171 of the 
codes were general human rights codes, 102 were human needs exemptions, and two of 
the codes referenced the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act codes since the projects 
under question involved regional projects between both China and Burma.  In total, 87 
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percent of U.S. votes for Chinese proposals in the MDBs had a human rights code 
attached.  In addition to the human rights codes, proposals from China had 155 codes 
applied by the U.S for lack of transparency in military spending, 38 codes applied by the 
U.S. for inadequate environmental protection, and seven codes applied by the U.S. for 
economic reasons (see Table 4.3).  The total number of codes applied to Chinese 
proposals is 475 codes on 315 proposals.   
 
Table 4.3 Number of Reason Codes Applied to Votes on China 
Code Applied 
Human Rights 275 
Transparency 155 
Environment 38 
Economic 7 
Total 475 
 
 
 The transparency codes reference Section 576 of the Foreign Appropriations Act 
of 1997 and Section 572 of the Foreign Appropriations Act of 1998.  These sections 
require the USEDs to vote against loans going to countries that do not have civilian 
auditing procedures in place for funds going to the armed forces, and have not provided 
requested audit information to the MDBs.  The environmental codes refer to Sec 521 of 
the International Development and Finance Act of 1989 and its subsequent amendments 
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in further legislation.  The original provision is known as the “Pelosi Amendment”, 
which was introduced by Rep Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca).  The Pelosi amendment requires the 
U.S. to vote no on proposals in the MDBs that would have significant environmental 
effects unless 120 days before the vote an environmental impact assessment has been 
completed by the borrowing country and the specific MDB.  In addition, the 
environmental impact assessment must include possible alternatives to the proposed 
project and it must be made available to the Executive Board of the institution before the 
scheduled vote (USGAO 2001).  The economic reason code does not refer to a specific 
piece of legislation but is simply used to indicate that the U.S. voted no on a particular 
proposal because it feels the project is of dubious economic value.  This is a right each 
member country of the Executive Board of each institution has under the Articles of 
Agreement for each institution.   
 Overall, looking at U.S. votes on proposals brought forth by China one can see 
clearly that the U.S. contests nearly every proposal that China brings forth in the MDBs. 
In fact China is an automatic basic human needs vote for the U.S. in the MDBs.  What 
this means is that the U.S. will only support proposals for China if the proposal supports 
basic human needs (Treasury Department Interview 2010).  The no vote position of the 
U.S. is part of a broader strategy of economic sanctions the U.S. has levied on China.  
These sanctions include limits on U.S. bilateral foreign assistance, bans on exports of 
defense related articles and services including munitions and dual use technology, and a 
ban on Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs. However, many of these 
restrictions can be waived or modified by the President (Rennack 2005).  These 
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prohibitions were instituted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre and have 
been maintained to varying degrees since. 
 
 Tiananmen Square and Aftermath 
 After the Cold War economic matters became more prominent in U.S. foreign 
policy while security factors were somewhat diminished.  This trend was the case in U.S. 
foreign policy towards China as well, allowing Congress and concerned interest groups to 
gain more opportunities to shape U.S. policy towards China.  Congress tends to play a 
bigger role in foreign economic matters (trade policy etc.) as opposed to strictly security 
matters, which are mostly the purview of the President.  In addition the continual 
reauthorization of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status provided an avenue for Congress 
(and interest groups through them) to influence policy toward China (Lampton 2001).  In 
general, U.S. foreign policy is often driven by the struggle of members of Congress who 
are subject to various particular pressures that often puts them at odds with the 
administration (regardless of partisanship of the President), and the President who have 
generally tried to maintain a non-antagonistic relationship with China (Garrison 2005). 
 The decision by the U.S. to use its position in the MDBs to induce better human 
rights practices in China began in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 
1989.  In the spring and early summer of 1989 the Chinese pro-Democracy movement 
was reaching its peak with pro-Democracy protestors congregating in Tiananmen Square 
for months.  Finally, on June 3rd and 4th the People’s Liberation Army was sent into the 
square to disperse the protestors and ended up killing hundreds and perhaps thousands of 
protestors (Drury and Li 2006). 
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 The Bush administration’s policy towards China was one of continual 
engagement.  The administration was reluctant to pursue sanctions that would disrupt the 
relationship they were developing.  However, in the immediate aftermath of the events at 
Tiananmen President Bush did suspend arm sales and an exchange of military 
delegations, but rejected calls for economic sanctions.  A coalition of right-wing anti-
Communists and human rights liberals in Congress were unsatisfied with President 
Bush’s response and advocated for strong economic sanctions to go along with the 
suspension of arms sales (Skidmore and Gates 1997).  President Bush resisted the call 
from members of Congress for imposing economic sanctions by stating that would be an 
“emotional response” to the crackdown (Weinraub 1989).    
 By June 20th Secretary Baker stated that the U.S. was suspending diplomatic 
contact with China and called on the World Bank to suspend new lending to China.  In 
addition, the administration announced that it would vote against proposals for China in 
the World Bank and AsDB.  The House of Representatives passed an amendment to the 
Foreign Aid Bill of that year 418-0, which included a ban on trade and development 
assistance, suspension of OPIC insurance, and an end to cooperation on nuclear energy 
development.  The Senate version of the legislation contained a provision allowing the 
President to waive the sanctions against China if it made progress on human rights and if 
the waiver was in the “national interest.”  This language was different from the House 
version, which stated the President could waive the restrictions only if they were in the 
“national security interest” of the U.S.  The Senate version won out allowing the 
President more flexibility in waiving the restrictions (Skidmore and Gates 1997). 
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 In addition to the automatic no vote by the U.S. in the MDBs the U.S. actively 
worked to deny loans to China in the MDBs.  In fact there was an agreement among the 
G7 countries in 1990 that they would approve loans to China only if they supported basic 
human needs.  In 1990 the World Bank did not make any loans to China except for six, 
all of which qualified as meeting basic human needs.  G7 opposition to MDB loans to 
China quickly dissipated, however, as additional exceptions were introduced which 
would allow support for MDB loans to China.  The additional criteria included loans that 
would facilitate economic reform and loans for projects that would benefit the 
environment.  With these extra criteria, along with the basic human needs criteria, it 
became easier for the rest of the G7 countries to support lending to China (Sanford 1997).  
The U.S. position towards China in the MDBs has been maintained since 1990 even as 
the rest of the G7 quickly abandoned their opposition.  Since the breakdown among G7 
countries on voting against loans to China the U.S. was not able to deny a loan to China, 
even though they continued to vote against them, until roughly ten years later.   
 
 Qinghai Loan 
 The next major confrontation the U.S. had concerning China in the MDBs was in 
1999 with the proposed resettlement of tens of thousands of Tibetans.  The World Bank 
originally approved a large anti-poverty proposal for China, which contained a section 
allocating $40 million that would require the resettlement of 58,000 farmers in Qinghai 
province, which is located next to Tibet.  The resettlement portion of the proposal drew 
criticism from the U.S., especially members of Congress, and others claiming that part of 
the purpose of the resettlement by the Chinese government was to dilute Tibetan culture 
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by reducing the number of ethnic Tibetans in the region.  There were also objections to 
the proposal based on concerns about its environmental impact.  The Executive Board of 
the World Bank approved the proposal over objections from the U.S., which voted no, 
and Germany along with abstentions from four other Executive Directors.  No funds were 
distributed for the proposal until the World Bank Inspection Panel reviewed it (Blustein 
1999).   
 The World Bank Inspection Panel was set up by the Executive Board in 1993 to 
serve as a forum for those who feel they may be adversely affected by World Bank 
projects to bring their objections to decision makers within the World Bank.  The 
Inspection Panel was meant to give non-state actors the ability to voice concerns they had 
regarding the social and environmental impact World Bank projects may have.   The 
Inspection Panel is also tasked with ensuring that the World Bank is following its own 
procedures and policies.  These policies are meant to ensure that World Bank projects 
provide social and environmental benefits not social and environmental harm (Roos 
2001).  The Inspection Panel’s conclusion was that the World Bank had violated some of 
its guidelines in approving the project.  Specifically, the Inspection Panel review 
concluded that the World Bank had violated its own procedures regarding environmental 
assessment, protecting indigenous peoples, preventing involuntary resettlement, pest 
management, and disclosure of information (Roos 2001).   
 With this information the U.S. and a coalition of other countries including Japan, 
Britain, and Germany managed to require additional review of the project before funds 
would be distributed to resettle the ethnic Tibetan farmers.  This resulted in effectively 
killing the project because China decided to withdraw the proposal from consideration, 
  
139 
stating that they would pay for the resettlement on their own (Kahn 2000).  The Chinese 
representative to the World Bank stated that, “The World Bank has lost a good 
opportunity to assist some of the poorest people in China.” (quoted in Moritsugu 2000)  
In addition the Chinese representative to the World Bank stated that China had to 
withdraw the proposal because of political pressure from the U.S.  Referring to the 
demand by the U.S. and others for further review of the proposal the Chinese delegate 
noted that, “compliance policies have been interpreted by some to an extreme and used 
for political purposes.” (quoted in Kahn 2000)  There was also significant activist 
pressure on the World Bank and sympathetic Executive Directors, including the USED, 
to stop the proposal from going through.  Activists associated with the International 
Campaign for Tibet and other activist groups had been protesting outside the World Bank 
headquarters in Washington D.C. for days (Moritsugu 2000).   
 Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 the U.S. has consistently voted 
against loans to China in the MDBs and only supported those loans that directly benefited 
basic human needs.  Since the U.S. does not have veto power in the Executive Boards of 
the MDBs it cannot stop loans going to China by itself.  However in a couple of 
instances, particularly in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre and with the 
withdrawal of the proposal by China of the Qinghai loan, the U.S. has been able to garner 
enough support on the Executive Board to actually stop lending to China in the MDBs.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The Place of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 The main findings of this dissertation suggest that human rights occupy an 
important but limited role in U.S. foreign policy.  Strategic interests, primarily supporting 
allies with military aid, are the primary determinant of positive U.S. votes in the MDBs; 
however, a country’s support for political rights are also a significant determinant of 
positive U.S. votes.  Specifically if the country in question is one of the worst violators of 
political rights the likelihood of U.S. support in the MDBs declines considerably.  More 
interesting results are when those two factors are dealt with together.  Specifically, how 
does the U.S. vote towards countries that have a poor record on protecting political rights 
but also receive military aid?  In this context countries that receive U.S. military aid are 
more likely to garner U.S. support in terms of positive votes in the MDBs.  However, 
those countries still receive less support overall from the U.S. than countries that protect 
political rights    Together these two findings illustrate the fact that normative and 
strategic goals both animate U.S. foreign policy.  More broadly, the tension between 
realism and liberalism is seen in the findings of why the U.S. votes in favor or against 
proposals in the MDBs.  
 Along with the strategic and normative goals of helping allies and promoting 
human rights, the level of development of recipient countries also determined U.S. yes 
votes.  The U.S. tended to support proposals going to countries with a lower level of 
development (as measured by GDP per capita) than countries with a higher level of 
development.  Of course all countries that are eligible for MDB loans are middle income 
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or low-income countries so U.S. lack of support for countries with a higher level of 
economic development needs to be put into that context.  Support for countries on the 
lower end of the development spectrum by the U.S. in some measure indicates that the 
U.S. is in line with the missions of the MDBs.  The main purpose of the MDBs is to 
provide development loans at below market rates for countries that have difficultly 
securing financing from the private sector.  Therefore those countries with low levels of 
per capita GDP are ideal targets for MDB support, which the U.S. appears to support.  
When looking at the issues of level of development and human rights together the 
question becomes does the U.S. still support loans to low GDP per capita countries even 
if they have a poor human rights record?  The results in this dissertation point out that for 
countries that were at lower levels of development and had a poor record on protecting 
political rights the U.S. voted in favor of those countries at a lower rate then countries at 
a comparative level of development but with a positive record on protecting human 
rights.  However, the U.S. still supported those countries more than it did their 
counterparts who also had poor records on protecting political rights but were at higher 
levels of development. 
 Recipient country respect for political rights was a significant factor but respect 
for rights of personal integrity was not significant.  In other words, countries that abused 
the political rights of their citizens were less likely to receive affirmative votes from the 
U.S. than those that respected those rights, but countries that abused the rights of personal 
integrity of their citizens faced no such sanction.  Previous studies have also found a 
similar pattern (Lebovic and Voeten 2009).  A potential explanation for this distinction 
between support for countries that respect political rights and not for countries that 
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respect rights of personal integrity is that support for political rights is often intertwined 
with the practice of democracy.  Democracy promotion is an important component of 
U.S. foreign policy overall and of the Bush administration in particular, which was 
creating policy for the majority of the time period under investigation in this study.   
 Also a somewhat surprising finding in this dissertation is the minor influence that 
UN voting similarity had on U.S. votes in the MDBs.  Recent research has suggested that 
voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN is an important determinant of the amount of 
money that is actually distributed for World Bank loans (Kilby 2010).  The inference here 
is that UN voting similarity is a proxy for the informal influence the U.S. exerts in the 
World Bank.  More specifically, the idea is that countries with a close UN voting 
similarity would receive more money for World Bank projects.  The results from this 
dissertation indicate that countries with a close UN voting similarity with the U.S. were 
slightly less likely to receive a yes vote from the U.S.  The incongruity between these two 
results might indicate that the U.S. exercises formal and informal influence in the MDBs 
in different ways.  The idea is that formally (through voting) the U.S. does not want to 
appear biased towards political allies but informally (through influencing the amount of 
money that is distributed to projects) the U.S. tries to favor its political allies.  
 Finally, in terms of the interaction between strategic interests and norms in 
determining U.S. votes in the MDBs, promoting domestic economic prosperity 
(measured by level of trade between the U.S. and recipient countries) was not significant 
in the full model.  On first glance it seems that this was not a priority for the U.S. in 
determining votes in the MDBs but when one looks at the results for the models without 
votes for China, level of trade becomes significant.  What this shows is two things; first 
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since China is the second largest trading partner of the U.S. it skewed the sample so when 
it was removed level of trade became significant.  Second, China had a large volume of 
proposals in the MDBs (4th most) and the U.S. voted no on the vast majority of them.  
Therefore without votes for Chinese proposals in the model level of trade is significant.  
This indicates that the U.S. is more supportive of loans going to countries in which it has 
a higher volume of trade then to countries with which it has a lower volume of trade.   
 In general, human rights and strategic interests both play a role in determining 
U.S. votes in the MDBs with strategic interests (such as supporting allies with military 
aid) somewhat more prominent that human rights in deciding how the U.S. will vote.  
Also the level of development of the recipient country plays an important role in 
determining how the U.S. will vote. 
 With reference to specific human rights policies the U.S. pursues in the MDBs 
two trends stand out.  First, as referenced above, a large percentage of U.S. no votes for 
human rights reasons were targeted at China.  As the case study on U.S. foreign policy 
towards China in the MDBs showed, the U.S. has targeted China for its human rights 
abuses going back to the Tiananmen Square killings in 1989.  This trend has continued as 
the U.S. mainly references section 701 of the IFI Act (general human rights code) as 
justification for voting no on proposals from China for human rights reasons.  The 
automatic no vote for proposals from China is just one of a variety of economic sanctions 
the U.S. maintains on China, from restrictions on bilateral economic assistance to bans on 
the sale of military and dual use technology to bans on Overseas Private investment 
Corporation programs, among others (Rennack 2005).  There is leeway in the application 
of these sanctions however as the President has the ability to modify or waive the 
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restrictions.  Regarding the prohibition on supporting proposals for China in the MDBs 
the U.S. can, and does, support proposals that benefit basic human needs.  So in effect the 
U.S. does end up lending its support to a fair amount of proposals for China in the MDBs 
but only if those proposals directly benefit people in need.   
 The other specific human rights trend that is made clear when analyzing U.S. 
voting patterns in the MDBs is votes against countries for failing to apprehend war 
criminals.  Serbia, and to a lesser extent Bosnia, was the primary target of these no votes. 
As with China, the number of codes applied to Serbia is reflective of the number of loan 
proposals that they bring before the Executive Boards but nevertheless the signal the US 
is sending is that they expect Serbia (and others) to comply with the ICTY by bringing 
suspected war criminals to justice.  Since 2001 Congress has condition aid to Serbia on 
three factors: cooperation with the ICTY, ending support for Bosnian Serb institutions, 
and protecting minority rights and the rule of law.  In the spring of each year the 
Secretary of State must certify if Serbia has met these requirements for the fiscal year, 
which means Serbian cooperation with the ICTY tends to increase as the certification 
deadline approaches.  For example, Slobodan Milosevic was arrested on April 1, 2001 
and was certified the next day by Secretary of State Powell (Woehrel 2008). 
 In summary, the general findings of this dissertation are in line with findings from 
studies focusing on the post-Cold War distribution of bilateral aid.  Those studies found 
that strategic goals, such as supporting allies with military aid, and normative goals, such 
as promoting political rights, are both foreign policy goals the U.S. pursues with bilateral 
aid.  Those are also policies the U.S. pursues in the MDBs.  On top of that the U.S. also 
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aligns itself with the mission of the MDBs by supporting proposals for the poorer 
countries in the MDBs.   
 In broader terms, what emerged from this dissertation is a notion that there are 
multiple factors that influence U.S. foreign policy and human rights are and important but 
limited one.  This dissertation fits with previous works on human rights and U.S. foreign 
policy in that it shows that human rights have a variable role in U.S. foreign policy.  Or in 
other words, human rights in U.S. foreign policy are context specific.  What was seen in 
this dissertation is that human rights, particularly political rights, influence U.S. foreign 
policy but they have to been situated into the broader context of strategic interests.  This 
can also be taken as evidence that strategic interests and normative values are not 
altogether separate issues and are instead perhaps re-enforcing and not competing. 
 
Ares for Further Research  
 As was stated in chapter two, the study of human rights and U.S. foreign policy in 
the MDBs was quite prominent in the 1980s but since then there has not been any 
sustained treatment of the subject.  This dissertation represents an update of that literature 
as well as an extension of the literature on U.S. bilateral aid and human rights.  With that 
being said there are still plenty of areas for further research.  Specifically, there are four 
areas in particular that the present study points towards for further research.     
 The first area for further research is to expand on the current model used in this 
dissertation.  This can primarily be done by including additional variables that address 
U.S. strategic interests and normative values.  For example, to further capture the 
dimension of strategic interests that includes promoting the domestic economy one could 
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include a measure of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI).  The assumption would be that 
the more U.S. FDI going to a recipient country the more likely the U.S. would vote in 
favor of proposals to that country since that country is a source for U.S. investment, 
indicating its importance for U.S. economic performance.  Another useful addition to the 
model would be the inclusion of a control variable for population.  Population is often 
included as a control variable in studies of U.S. bilateral aid as the assumption is that 
larger countries require greater volume of aid.  Similar logic could also apply to votes in 
the MDBs as larger countries tend to have more proposals than smaller countries. 
 The second area for further research is moving beyond an analysis of formal votes 
in the MDBs to examine informal processes the U.S. may use to promote human rights or 
other foreign policy goals.  As was also mentioned in chapter two there has been previous 
research indicating that the U.S. exercises a lot of informal influence in the MDBs (Babe 
2009; McKeown 2009; Wade 2002; Woods 2003, 2000;).  However, this research does 
not focus on whether or not the U.S. uses its informal influence to promote human rights 
in the MDBs (at least not primarily).    Pivoting off of the present study, however, one 
could ask does the U.S. use its informal influence to promote human rights in the MDBs 
and if so how?  One of the weaknesses of the present study is by relying on formal votes 
as an indicator for how the U.S. promotes human rights it does not account for those 
proposals that fail to make it before the Executive Boards for a vote.  It is in this area 
where the U.S. may exert informal influence in shaping and preventing proposals from 
being developed.  This would provide a more comprehensive view of how human rights 
fit into U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs. 
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 The third area for further research would be to examine whether the amount of 
money distributed for MDB loans is greater for loans the U.S. supported in contrast to 
loans that passed the Executive Board but were not supported by the U.S.  Kilby (2010) 
argues that close U.N. voting similarity with the U.S. correlates with more money 
distributed for loans for those countries.  Kilby (2010) however does not see how the 
amount of funds distributed correlates with U.S. votes.  This would be another means of 
testing U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs and one could also examine how the human 
rights record of recipient states influence both U.S. votes but also the amount of money 
distributed. 
 A fourth area of potential research is a comparison of U.S with votes of other 
countries in the MDBs.  A comparative approach would provide further context for U.S. 
votes in seeing whether the U.S. supports or opposes proposals at different rates then 
other countries.  Another approach would be to see if other countries aside from the U.S. 
take the human rights record of the recipient country into account when deciding whether 
to vote on the proposal or not.  One problem in this area, however, is the lack of available 
voting data for other countries to compare with the U.S.  The World Bank has recently 
started to release the minutes of the Executive Board meetings to the public but there is 
often times little detail on voting procedures contained within (McIntosh 2009).  The 
other MDBs have also been less than forthcoming with voting information from their 
Executive Board meetings.  Despite these limitations there is still ample room for further 
research in the area of human rights and U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs. 
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Normative Considerations 
 One final issue to consider is what place human rights should occupy in U.S. 
foreign policy in the MDBs.  The purpose of this dissertation has been empirical, to 
discern the actual place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs.  There are 
however normative implications that should be considered as well.  This section will not 
attempt a systematic consideration of all normative issues involved but only briefly touch 
on the issue.  Specifically, this section will only briefly consider what obligations the 
U.S. has to promote human rights in the MDBs. 
 The purpose of human rights (or what human rights do) is to protect human 
agency against abuse and oppression (Ignatieff 2001). Rights in general give rise to duties 
that seek the realization or fulfillment of those rights.  For example, human rights have 
traditionally been thought to create a vertical duty for states to promote and protect the 
rights of individuals within their territory (Knox 2008).  That states have a duty to protect 
the human rights of their own citizens is not however the main issue when considering 
U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs.  In this instance the question become what obligations 
does the U.S. have to promote and protect the human rights of people in other countries?  
Specifically, what obligations does the U.S. have to promote human rights through the 
distribution of MDB development projects?   
 There are a variety of ethical theories, which posit obligations for states to adhere 
to in the protection and promotion of human rights outside their boarders, the most 
common of which is probably cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism takes the individual as 
the starting point for moral consideration and therefore questions the notion that state 
boundaries are the boundaries of moral obligation (Cochran 1999).  Cosmopolitanism 
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constitutes a “concern for the whole” or a level of identity above national citizenship, 
which implies that individuals or institutions have duties towards others outside of your 
immediate community (Anderson-Gold 2001).  This idea has perhaps most forcefully 
been developed in the work of Thomas Pogge, who writes of the duties implicit in the 
concept of human rights. In his writing on global poverty Pogge (2002) argues that 
citizens of the world’s wealthiest nations, as participants in the global economic order, 
share an institutional background, which creates a duty to help the world’s poor who 
suffer at the hands of the current economic order. Pogge claims, “that the citizens and 
governments of the wealthy societies, by imposing the present global economic order, 
significantly contribute to the persistence of severe poverty and thus share institutional 
moral responsibility for it.” (2002: 140)  Pogge claims that governments and individuals 
do have duties beyond their borders to promote human rights (although his specific claim 
is in reducing poverty).  The one drawback of Pogge’s argument as a basis for deriving 
duties is a lack of specification about those duties.   
 A perhaps more fruitful theory to determine duties to promote human rights 
across borders is Amartya Sen’s theory of human rights (2004). Sen conceptualizes 
human rights as primarily ethical demands. From Sen’s perspective the importance of 
human rights derives from the freedoms that form the substance of those rights, meaning 
“the human right of not being tortured springs from the importance of freedom from 
torture for all.” (2004: 321) For a freedom to be numbered as a human rights it has to 
meet the criteria of (1) importance, meaning the freedom has to be of such importance 
that society should focus on it, and (2) “social influencability”, meaning that it can be 
guaranteed through social help (Sen 2004: 329-330). 
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 Because of their basis in human freedom, human rights generate reasons for 
acting for those who are positioned to promote or keep safe those freedoms.  More 
specifically those reasons for acting can create both perfect and imperfect obligations. 
Perfect obligations create specific acts that particular individuals or actors have to 
perform to ensure the protection of a right, while imperfect obligations go beyond the 
specifics of perfect obligations.  Imperfect obligations according to Sen, “involve the 
demand that serious consideration be given by anyone in a position to provide reasonable 
help to the person whose human right is threatened.” (2004: 341) 
 For example, a perfect obligation would be to not torture.  In this case the specific 
action (or non-action) delineated by the duty is to refrain from the act of torture.  The 
specific actions required by an imperfect obligation in this context are more complicated.  
In this instance the actions required are dependent on the position of the individual 
involved.  With regards to the torture scenario, if one guard was torturing a prisoner 
while another guard was standing by observing, one could claim, using the notion of 
imperfect obligations, the second guard is required to do what is reasonably expected to 
stop the first guard from torturing the prisoner.  This could include a variety of actions 
including physically stopping the first guard from torturing the prisoner to alerting a 
supervisor   It is important to point out that perfect and imperfect obligations only differ 
in their content (i.e. what they require an individual or institution to do) not in their 
connection to specific rights (Sen 2004). Essentially, the notion of perfect and imperfect 
obligations create a structured ethic that requires different actions from individuals and 
institutions depending on their distance or proximity to the right in question. 
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 In the case of U.S. votes in the MDBs then how might the structured ethic of 
perfect and imperfect obligations guide U.S. voting policy with regards to human rights?  
In terms of perfect obligations the U.S. has an obligation to refrain from direct abuses of 
human rights.  This is not really the issue with votes in the MDBs, which really involves 
potential indirect support for human rights violations.  If the U.S. supports loans that go 
to rights abusing regimes that may be considered indirect support for human rights 
violations.  Conversely, however, the U.S. can also put itself in the position of indirectly 
supporting human rights violations by voting against projects because the government 
receiving them is rights repressive but the money distributed might be beneficial to the 
population regardless.   
 In practical terms then the basic human needs approach seems to be the best way 
for the U.S. to maintain its imperfect obligations towards human rights in the MDBs.  As 
was mentioned in chapter four many of the legislative mandates that require the U.S. to 
oppose proposals for countries that violate human rights also contain a clause that allows 
for exceptions if the assistance meets basic human needs.  This approach seems to thread 
the needle between punishing rights abusing states by voting no on projects that do not 
satisfy basic human needs but also refrains from punishing vulnerable populations by 
supporting proposals that directly benefit them.  In conclusion, it appears that the U.S. is 
responding to its imperfect obligations towards human rights in the MDBs in an 
acceptable way.  This is contingent however, on how the basic human needs exceptions 
are utilized in that they are not used as a smokescreen to still support loans for rights 
abusing states but with the veneer of helping needy people. 
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List of MDB Reason Codes 
Reason Code Description 
1. Economic and policy considerations 
2. Surplus commodities as defined under  P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 514. 
3. Communist dictatorships, as governed by P.L. 98-181, Sec. 804.  
4. Surplus mineral production, as governed by  P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, 
Sec. 514. 
5. Expropriation, as governed by P.L. 103-236, Sec. 527.  The assistance does not support 
basic human needs.  
6. Narcotics, as governed by P.L. 87-195, Sec. 490(a)(2) and 490A(a)(2), as amended by 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, by the International Narcotics Control Act 
of 1992, and by P.L. 103-447, Sec. 101 and further amended in P.L. 104-66, Sec. 1112 
(d). 
7. Human rights, as governed by P.L. 95-118, Sec. 701, and amended by P.L. 101-240 
Sec. 541(c), and P.L. 102-511, Sec. 1008. The assistance supports basic human needs. 
8. Human rights, as governed by P.L. 95-118, Sec. 701, and amended by P.L. 101-240, 
Sec. 541(c), and P.L. 102-511, Sec. 1008. The assistance does not support basic 
human needs.  
9. Environmental reporting, as governed by P.L. 101-240, Sec. 521, as amended by P.L. 
105-118, Sec. 560(b)(3) and by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations  
2005, Sec. 793. 
10. International terrorism, as governed by P.L. 104-132, Sec. 327.  
11. Chemical and biological weapons production, as governed by Executive Order 12735.  
12. Harboring indictees for war crimes, as governed by P.L. 107-115, Sec. 581(b-d). 
13. Policy towards Burma (human rights/democratic government), as governed by P.L. 
104-208, Sec. 570(a)(2).  
14. Government of Cambodia, as governed by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005, 
Sec. 554(a).   The assistance does not support basic human needs. 
15. Government of Cambodia, as governed by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005, 
Sec. 554(a).   The assistance supports basic human needs 
16. Other environmental reporting (e.g., Treasury policy votes not specified in #9 above). 
17. Nuclear material, as governed by P.L. 103-236, Sec. 823.  
18. Palm oil, sugar, and citrus, as governed by P.L. 95-118, Sec. 901(a). 
19. Serbia or Montenegro, as governed by P.L. 103-160, Defense Authorization, Sec. 
1511(c) and P.L. 104-208, Sec. 540. 
20.  Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign 
Operations 2006, Sec. 561(a)(1).  Exceptions or waiver authority not  
applied.  
21. Worker rights, trade distortion, surplus capacity, as governed by P.L. 100-202, Sec. 
406(1). 
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List of MDB Reason Codes Continued 
22. Female genital mutilation, as governed by P.L. 104-208, Sec. 579. 
23. Sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices, as governed by P.L. 103-236, 
Sec. 826(a) as amended by Sec. 102(b)(2)(E).                    
The assistance supports basic human needs.  
24. Sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices, as governed by P.L. 103-236, 
Sec. 826(a) as amended by Sec. 102(b)(2)(E).                              
The assistance does not support basic human needs.  
25. Waiver of sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices with respect to India 
and Pakistan, as governed by P.L. 106-79, Department of Defense  
Appropriations Act, 2000, Title IX, Sec. 9001(a).  
26. Expropriation, as governed by P.L. 103-236. Sec. 527.  The assistance supports basic 
human needs. 
27. IMF bailouts of banks, as governed by P.L. 98-181, Sec. 807. 
28. Religious persecution, as governed by P.L. 105-292, Title V, Sec. 402, 405(12) and 
422.  The assistance supports basic human needs. 
29. Religious persecution, as governed by P.L. 105-292, Title V, Sec. 402, 405(12) and 
422.  The assistance does not support basic human needs. 
30. Serbia-Montenegro, as governed by P.L. 105-277, Sec. 514(b). 
31.  Cuba, as governed by P.L. 104-114, Sec. 104.  
  
32. Sanctions on use of chemical or biological weapons, as governed by P.L. 102-182, Sec. 
307. 
33. Chemical weapons sanctions on disclosure of confidential business information, as 
governed by P.L. 105-277, Division I, Sec. 103(e)(2)(A), Sec.  
103(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Sec. 103(e)(3)(B)(v).  
34. IMF Korea, as governed by P.L. 105-277, Sec. 602(a), (1998). 
35. Transparency of budgets: audit of military expenditures, as governed by P.L. 104-208, 
Sec. 576  as amended by P.L. 105-118, Sec. 572.                              
The assistance supports basic human needs. 
36. Transparency of budgets: audit of military expenditures, as governed by P.L. 104-208, 
Sec. 576  as amended by P.L. 105-118, Sec. 572.                               
The assistance does not support basic human needs. 
37. Serbia, as governed by P.L. 106-113, Sec. 599(b)(1), (1999). 
38. Serbia, as governed by P.L. 106-429, Sec. 594(b), (2000). 
39. User fees, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 562. 
40. Trafficking in persons, as governed by P.L. 106-386, Sec. 110.  The assistance 
supports one or more specified exceptions. 
41.  Trafficking in persons, as governed by P.L. 106-386, Sec. 110.  The assistance does 
not qualify under any specified exception. 
42. IMF programs and debt levels, as governed by P.L. 98-181, Sec. 806. 
43.  Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign 
Operations 2006, Sec. 561(a)(1). Exceptions or waiver authority applies. 
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List of MDB Reason Codes Continued 
44. USA PATRIOT Act on deterring international terrorism, as governed by P.L. 107-56, 
Sec. 360.  
45.  Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, P.L. 107-99. 
46.  Zimbabwe, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 572.  
  
47. Serbia, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Sec. 563 (Foreign Operations 2006).  If Serbia 
is not certified. 
48.  Serbia, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Sec. 563 (Foreign Operations 2006).  If Serbia 
is certified.  
49. India IBRD Water and Sewage, as governed by P.L. 107-115, Foreign Operations 
FY2002, Title IV. 
50. Tibet, as governed by P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003, Sec 
616(b).  
51. East Timor, as governed by P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003, 
Sec. 633.  
52.  Sudan, as governed by P.L. 107-245,  Sudan Peace Act section 6(b)(2) (2002). 
53. Burma, as governed by Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, P.L. 108-61. 
54. Burma, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 526(a).  
55. Iraq, as governed by P.L. 108-11, Sec. 1503, as amended by P.L. 108-106, Sec. 2204. 
56. Tibet, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 575(a).  
57. Commodities or minerals in surplus on world markets, as governed by P.L. 99-472 of the 
Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986. 
58. Copper exports, mines and mining, as governed by P.L. 99-88, Sec. 501. 
59. Mining, smelting and refining, as governed by P.L. 99-88, Sec. 502, as amended by P.L. 
102-285. 
60. Commodities, products, or minerals for export, as governed by P.L. 100-202, Foreign 
Operations, FY1987, Title XIV, Sec. 1403(b) of the IFI Act, as amended  
by P.L. 106-36, Title I, Sec. 1002. 
61. Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, 2004, as governed by P.L. 108-497.  
62. Project could have significant environmental impacts, but such impacts have been 
mitigated Development outcomes expected to be broadly positive.  
 
63. Sri Lanka, as governed by P.L. 111-117, Division F, Sec.7089.  The assistance 
supports basic human needs. 
64. Sri Lanka, as governed by P.L. 111-117, Division F, Sec.7089.  The assistance does 
not support basic human needs. 
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List of Human Rights Codes by Specific Country and Code 
Code Bosnia Bulgaria Burundi Cambodia China 
 
 
Croatia E Guinea Iran 
(7) General HR 
(Human Needs) 0 0 0 0 102 
 
0 0 1 
(8) General HR 0 0 2 0 171 0 2 3 
(12) War Crimes 
(Harboring) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
(13) Policy Towards 
Burma (Human 
Rights/Democratic 
Governance) 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 
(14) Cambodia 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 
(15) Cambodia 
(Human Needs) 0 0 0 5 0 
 
0 0 0 
(20) War Crimes 
(failure to 
apprehend) 27 4 0 0 0 
 
 
1 0 0 
(21) Worker Rights 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
(22) FGM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(28) Religious 
Persecution (Human 
Needs) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
0 0 0 
(29) Religious 
Persecution 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
(40) Trafficking 
(Exemption) 0 0 0 1 0 
 
0 0 0 
(41) Trafficking 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
(43) War Crimes 
(Failure to 
Apprehend-
Exemption) 6 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
0 0 0 
(45) Zimbabwe 
(Democracy and 
Econ Recovery Act) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
0 0 0 
(46) Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(47) Serbia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(48) Serbia 
(certified) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
(52) Sudan (Sudan 
Peace Act 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
(53) Burma 
(freedom and dem 
act) 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
0 0 0 
(63) Sri Lanka 
(Human Needs) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
(64) Sri Lanka  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 34 4 2 16 275 1 2 4 
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List of Human Rights Codes by Specific Country and Code Continued 
 
Code 
Kazakhstan  Kenya Lebanon Libya Moldova Myanmar Regional 
(7) General HR 
(Human Needs) 
 
0 1 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 1 
(8) General HR 2 0 1 0 0 0 4 
(12) War Crimes 
(Harboring) 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
(13) Policy Towards 
Burma (Human 
Rights/Democratic 
Governance) 
 
 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 0 5 0 
(14) Cambodia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(15) Cambodia 
(Human Needs) 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
(20) War Crimes 
(failure to 
apprehend) 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 2 0 20 
(21) Worker Rights 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
(22) FGM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(28) Religious 
Persecution (Human 
Needs) 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 0 0 0 
(29) Religious 
Persecution 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
(40) Trafficking 
(Exemption) 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
(41) Trafficking 0 0 1 1 0 4 1 
(43) War Crimes 
(Failure to 
Apprehend-
Exemption) 
 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
0 0 0 2 
(45) Zimbabwe 
(Democracy and 
Econ Recovery Act) 
 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 
(46) Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(47) Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(48) Serbia 
(certified) 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
(52) Sudan (Sudan 
Peace Act 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
 0 0 0 1 
(53) Burma 
(freedom and dem 
act) 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 0 5 0 
(63) Sri Lanka 
(Human Needs) 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
(64) Sri Lanka  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 1 2 1 2 14 29 
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List of Human Rights Codes by Specific Country and Code Continued 
Code 
Romania Russia Serbia Sri 
Lanka 
Sudan Uganda Venezuela Zimbabwe 
(7) General HR 
(Human Needs) 0 0 
 
0 0 2 
 
0 0 
 
0 
(8) General HR 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
(12) War 
Crimes 
(Harboring) 0 0 
 
0 
0 0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
(13) Policy 
Towards Burma 
(Human 
Rights/Democra
tic Governance) 0 0 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
 
 
0 
(14) Cambodia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(15) Cambodia 
(Human Needs) 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 
(20) War 
Crimes (failure 
to apprehend) 2 2 
 
 
83 0 0 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
0 
(21) Worker 
Rights 0 0 
 
0 0 1 
 
0 0 
 
0 
(22) FGM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(28) Religious 
Persecution 
(Human Needs) 0 0 
 
 
0 0 1 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
0 
(29) Religious 
Persecution 0 0 
 
0 0 5 
 
0 0 
 
0 
(40) Trafficking 
(Exemption) 0 0 
 
0 0 1 
 
0 1 
 
0 
(41) Trafficking 0 0 0 0 3 1 8 1 
(43) War 
Crimes (Failure 
to Apprehend-
Exemption) 0 0 
 
 
 
6 0 0 
 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
 
0 
(45) Zimbabwe 
(Democracy and 
Econ Recovery 
Act) 0 0 
 
 
 
0 0 0 
 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
 
0 
(46) Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(47) Serbia 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 
(48) Serbia 
(certified) 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 
(52) Sudan 
(Sudan Peace 
Act 0 0 
 
0 
0 7 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
(53) Burma 
(freedom and 
dem act) 0 0 
 
 
0 0 0 
 
 
0 0 
 
 
0 
(63) Sri Lanka 
(Human Needs) 0 0 
 
0 3 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 
(64) Sri Lanka  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 2 101 4 25 1 9 1 
         
  
170 
List of Total Number of Votes Per Country Per Year 
Country       2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
                
Afghanistan 17 15 21 14 12 18 97 
Albania 7 6 9 11 13 7 53 
Algeria 0 2 6 0 2 4 14 
Angola 2 9 2 4 5 3 25 
Antigua and Barbuda 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Argentina 26 27 37 38 41 26 195 
Armenia 11 8 16 24 12 20 91 
Australia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Azerbaijan 16 21 19 22 23 15 116 
Bahamas 1 4 2 2 1 0 10 
Bahrain 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Bangladesh 19 17 14 19 25 16 110 
Barbados 0 4 3 1 4 4 16 
Belarus 5 10 4 12 8 8 47 
Belize 2 3 5 3 3 6 22 
Benin 11 5 10 4 11 4 45 
Bhutan 1 3 6 6 3 2 21 
Bolivia 20 23 15 23 17 17 115 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 8 16 14 18 15 11 82 
Botswana 2 3 2 3 1 7 18 
Brazil 46 53 56 65 78 71 369 
Brunei 0 2 0 2 2 0 6 
Bulgaria 12 21 8 20 16 16 93 
Burkina Faso 15 10 14 9 15 8 71 
Burundi 14 3 6 4 10 12 49 
Cambodia 12 15 9 15 20 14 85 
Cameroon 6 5 8 2 8 9 38 
Canary Island 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Cape Verde 4 2 4 5 4 2 21 
Central African Repub 1 2 2 5 5 11 26 
Chad 7 8 3 4 2 6 30 
Chile 16 17 17 26 26 15 117 
China 43 62 60 59 44 47 315 
Colombia 22 34 41 32 38 35 202 
Comoros 2 0 1 0 2 5 10 
Congo, DR 11 14 2 8 10 8 53 
Congo, Rep 8 1 2 3 4 6 24 
Cook Islands 0 2 1 0 1 2 6 
Costa Rica 4 13 14 11 14 6 62 
Cote d`Ivoire 5 3 3 2 10 8 31 
Croatia 9 10 12 19 14 15 79 
Czech Republic 3 2 0 2 2 0 9 
Djibouti 5 4 1 5 6 2 23 
Dominica 1 2 1 2 1 0 7 
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List of Total Number of Votes Per Country Per Year Continued 
Dominican Republic 10 15 15 15 10 20 85 
Dubai 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Ecuador 16 12 27 27 14 7 103 
Egypt 9 10 18 20 13 18 88 
El Salvador 12 27 13 9 10 12 83 
Equatorial Guinea 1 2 0 0 4 1 8 
Eritrea 4 1 2 1 3 1 12 
Estonia 1 3 2 2 2 2 12 
Ethiopia 20 4 10 9 14 10 67 
FYR Macedonia 8 6 6 13 7 7 47 
Fiji 0 2 3 0 0 3 8 
Gabon 2 5 2 3 1 4 17 
Gambia 4 3 4 2 5 4 22 
Georgia 7 18 20 19 17 18 99 
Ghana 14 13 10 24 16 13 90 
Grenada 3 3 0 3 3 1 13 
Grenadines 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Guatemala 13 18 21 15 23 16 106 
Guinea 4 5 12 4 6 1 32 
Guinea-Bissau 7 1 4 1 8 7 28 
Guyana 10 2 14 6 5 3 40 
Haiti 3 16 15 7 14 23 78 
Honduras 17 24 16 18 29 12 116 
Hong Kong 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Hungary 4 3 3 4 1 10 25 
India 40 37 68 67 56 52 320 
Indonesia 28 42 32 23 22 26 173 
Iran 5 3 0 0 0 0 8 
Iraq 1 3 2 1 1 2 10 
Jamaica 3 6 6 6 12 15 48 
Jordan 1 4 3 5 8 6 27 
Kazakhstan 12 17 17 29 22 26 123 
Kenya 16 10 17 11 7 17 78 
Kiribati 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 
Korea 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kosovo 0 4 3 8 0 3 18 
Kyrgyz Rep 14 14 8 18 14 25 93 
Laos 7 19 15 10 15 11 77 
Latvia 2 3 2 4 1 4 16 
Lebanon 1 1 0 9 2 3 16 
Lesotho 3 4 3 5 2 5 22 
Liberia 3 1 2 9 11 9 35 
Libya 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 
Lithuania 2 4 5 4 3 4 22 
Madagascar 13 13 13 16 10 3 68 
Malawi 2 9 6 5 5 7 34 
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List of Total Number of Votes Per Country Per Year Continued 
Malaysia 0 2 2 4 2 1 11 
Maldives 1 5 4 2 5 3 20 
Mali 14 10 11 6 10 12 63 
Marshall Islands 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 
Mauritania 7 3 8 2 8 2 30 
Mauritius 2 4 2 2 3 7 20 
Mexico 24 47 41 41 42 29 224 
Micronesia 2 0 1 1 0 1 5 
Moldova 8 13 12 14 17 13 77 
Mongolia 10 6 10 20 17 12 75 
Montenegro 0 0 1 12 6 7 26 
Morocco 5 8 13 9 8 8 51 
Mozambique 6 9 11 17 8 7 58 
Myanmar 0 6 1 1 2 0 10 
Namibia 3 4 1 2 1 1 12 
Nauru 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Nepal 13 3 11 8 8 18 61 
Nicaragua 18 15 21 17 22 20 113 
Niger 6 7 9 6 12 7 47 
Nigeria 15 21 19 20 16 24 115 
Oman 1 3 1 1 0 0 6 
Pakistan 29 45 34 45 19 25 197 
Palau 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Panama 5 6 14 21 22 12 80 
Papua New Guinea 1 2 5 8 2 8 26 
Paraguay 3 23 13 18 17 13 87 
Peru 24 19 42 40 25 39 189 
Philippines 17 18 15 19 17 15 101 
Poland 17 13 10 4 5 15 64 
Regional 60 53 81 51 63 77 385 
Romania 32 36 31 26 16 20 161 
Russia 68 92 119 94 63 69 505 
Rwanda 14 6 8 4 12 15 59 
Samoa 2 2 2 6 2 1 15 
Sao Tome and Principe 4 0 1 0 2 1 8 
Saudi Arabia 1 2 2 1 1 1 8 
Senegal 12 13 14 3 13 15 70 
Serbia 5 7 16 22 12 22 84 
Serbia - Montenegro 25 18 12 0 0 0 55 
Seychelles 1 4 2 0 2 3 12 
Sierra Leone 7 8 2 3 7 9 36 
Singapore 0 0 1 2 1 0 4 
Slovakia 1 4 1 3 1 3 13 
Slovenia 1 1 1 3 1 0 7 
Solomon Islands 0 0 3 2 3 5 13 
Somalia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
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List of Total Number of Votes Per Country Per Year Continued 
 
South Africa 9 8 7 15 3 5 47 
Sri Lanka 14 16 6 13 8 14 71 
St. Kitts & Nevis 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
St. Lucia 6 3 1 3 3 0 16 
St. Vincent & Gren 4 1 1 1 0 1 8 
Sudan 6 2 1 1 3 3 16 
Suriname 5 1 1 6 2 2 17 
Swaziland 0 4 2 0 2 0 8 
Syria 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Tajikistan 15 14 14 11 12 18 84 
Tanzania 25 9 18 20 10 12 94 
Thailand 2 9 4 2 4 3 24 
Timor-Leste 1 2 2 7 1 2 15 
Togo 4 1 4 1 9 8 27 
Tonga 0 1 1 0 2 2 6 
Trinidad & Tobago 1 2 4 2 2 3 14 
Tunisia 6 8 5 4 8 12 43 
Turkey 16 20 18 19 13 26 112 
Turkmenistan 3 2 1 4 2 6 18 
Tuvalu 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 
USA 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Uganda 16 11 11 14 14 18 84 
Ukraine 19 36 42 47 41 30 215 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Uruguay 8 15 16 18 18 10 85 
Uzbekistan 12 9 9 10 10 10 60 
Vanuatu 0 0 1 0 0 3 4 
Venezuela 4 6 3 3 1 2 19 
Vietnam 17 31 21 25 28 28 150 
West Bank and Gaza 4 2 6 2 11 6 31 
Yemen 1 3 7 7 8 10 36 
Zambia 11 6 7 9 7 6 46 
Zimbabwe 0 4 2 0 0 3 9 
                
Total 1,392 1,616 1,706 1,742 1,641 1,669 9,766 
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